## Hearing Transcript

## 2017 Automobile Insurance Review

June 8, 2018

## PRESENT:

## The Board:

Darlene Whalen, Chair and CEO
Dwanda Newman, Vice-Chair
James Oxford, Commissioner

## Board Counsel/ Staff:

Jacqueline Glynn, Board Counsel
Ryan Oake, Board Staff

Presenters
Paula Elliott, Oliver Wyman

Parties (Alphabetical Order)
Atlantic Provinces Trial Lawyers Association Ernest Gittens
Barry Mason, Q.C.

## Campaign to Protect Accident Victims

Colin Feltham
Jerome Kennedy, Q.C.

## Consumer Advocate

Dennis Browne, Q.C.
Andrew Wadden

## Insurance Bureau of Canada ( IBC)

Amanda Dean
Kevin Stamp, Q.C.
Terry Rowe, Q.C.
Trevor Foster
Spinal Cord Injury NL
Thomas Fraize, Q.C.
Lara Fraize-Burry
Michael Burry

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(9:02 a.m.)
CHAIR:
Q. Good morning, everybody. I guess, I'll go
    straight to you, Ms. Glynn.
MS. GLYNN:
Q. Yes, Madam Chair, we do have one point of
    clarification that Ms. Elliott would like to
    make from her questions yesterday. We have
    brought up the transcript from yesterday,
    page 135, and it was in relation to a
    question from Mr. Fraize and where the cap
    amounts that she referred to in her report,
    where did they come from. Ms. Elliott, if
    you could provide that clarification,
    please.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes. Yesterday in response to the question,
        I referenced - I stated that the outline of
        the cap amounts and the deductible amounts
        were in the terms of reference. I
        incorrectly stated that they were, in fact,
        on the Board's website, but in the Board's
        letter which was dated August 11th, 2017, and
        I referenced that in my description in our
        report on the Closed Claim Study, there's
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            Page 2
        footnote 1 , where we referenced that those
        amounts were from the Board's letter dated
        August 11th, 2017, which I misstated
        yesterday in my response.
    MS. GLYNN:
    Q. Thank you, Ms. Elliott. With that
        clarification, Ms. Elliott is ready to make
        her presentation on the Profitability Review
        for the Private Passenger Automobiles.
    MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. Okay. I'm going to briefly go over the
highlights of the Profit Study that we
prepared for this hearing. Our study is
broken into three parts, if you will. One
is the review of the historic profit levels
for private passenger automobile in the
Province of Newfoundland over a ten year
period ending 2016. We also do a review -
the second part is our estimate of the
required average premium in hindsight for
the years, the accident years 2012 to 2016,
each of those five years. We compare that
to what the actual premium was that was
earned by the company in each of those years
by coverage, and our third part of the study

Page 1
Page 3
is an assessment of what the private passenger rate adequacy would be for the accident year of 2017. This report was prepared using industry-wide data for private passenger auto in the province as at to the end of June 30th, 2017. So we don't have the full - at the time of this study, we didn't have the complete 2017 year.

On page 6 of the pdf counting, or page 2 of the report, Table 1, this is the summary of the first part of the study looking back at the history of profit levels in the province for private passenger automobile, and first it's important to understand that each of the years are accident years, and we discussed what an accident year was earlier in the week, but to repeat myself for clarity here, it is a reflection of all the claims that occurred in that year regardless of when the claim is closed. It accounts for all the accidents, the events that occurred in that year, and, of course, accidents that would have occurred in 2016 would not, by any means, be all settled at the end of June 30th, 2017.

Page 4
So for each of these accident years, we are looking at what were the premiums that were collected, what were the amounts of investment income earned in that year, what is the estimate of the losses that would be paid for those accidents that occurred in that year, and what are the operating expenses of running the insurance operation for private passenger auto, those expenses such as premium taxes and commissions.

Then we base our findings here of the profit level by accident year on two basis. One is the profit before tax as a percentage of the premium, and that's the POP. The other comparison was for a return on the amount of equity that is assigned on an after tax basis, and in this chart we're assuming that the return on equity is - that there would be $\$ 1.00$ of equity or capital for every $\$ 2.00$ of premium that is earned.

You may wonder what is this equity, but the other day we looked at taxi experience for 2012, and approximately there were 6 million dollars in losses, and 2 million dollars in premiums. So there's this 4

| 1 | million dollar gap, and that's what the | 1 | ue to |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2 | equity would be used for. When there are | 2 | the fact that in our review when we prepared |
| 3 | losses well in excess of the premiums that | 3 | this report, we had the more recent data |
| 4 | are earned, something has to be used to pay | 4 | available to us, whereas GISA hadn't |
| 5 | those claims and that's where the equity has | 5 | published a new exhibit at the time of the |
| 6 | to step up and do that if there's not | 6 | preparation of this report we're discussing. |
| 7 | sufficient premium. | 7 | At Table 5, these are the operating |
| 8 | So profit levels are often measured, as | 8 | expenses. So this is the expenses for |
| 9 | any business, as a return on equity and | 9 | private passenger auto in Newfoundland. |
| 10 | that's one of the purposes of the equity in | 10 | This is the information that is required to |
| 11 | the insurance company is to stand behind the | 11 | be reported by the companies, by the |
| 12 | policy holders if the premiums aren't | 12 | insurers, to GISA, and it's compiled. These |
| 13 | sufficient to pay those claims. | 13 | are the expense ratios. The more recent |
| 14 | The components that we look at when we | 14 | five years it's a slightly lower loss ratio |
| 15 | are determining this, there's three parts. | 15 | than the prior periods. These expense |
| 16 | For any rate setting and looking at the | 16 | ratios would include the brokers' |
| 17 | premiums, those are the losses that are paid | 17 | commissions, premium taxes which are now 5 |
| 18 | or expected to be paid. They are the | 18 | percent in the province, and the operating |
| 19 | operating expenses for the company and then | 19 | expenses of running an operation here in the |
| 20 | a provision for profit. So that's what | 20 | province, so the salaries that are paid, the |
| 21 | makes up the premium. In this case, we're | 21 | rents that are paid. These are the expenses |
| 22 | looking at what were the premiums paid, how | 22 | associated with running the operation, they |
| 23 | much investment income was earned, a | 23 | are not associated with any claims handling |
| 24 | positive, if you will, and then what are the | 24 | costs. |
| 25 | losses that would be paid or expected to be | 25 | Table 6 is the investment income |
|  | Page 6 |  | Page 8 |
| 1 | paid, and what are the expenses, and what's | 1 | assumptions. The investment income rates, |
| 2 | left over there is the profit and that's | 2 | these are pre-tax investment income rates. |
| 3 | what we're measuring. Under the POP, that's | 3 | They have been declining since 2007 at a |
| 4 | the percentage of the premium for each of | 4 | high of 6.1 over the ten year period. These |
| 5 | those years, and then return on equity as a | 5 | investment income rates, return on |
| 6 | percentage of the equity that is notionally | 6 | investment rates, these are based on the |
| 7 | allocated. | 7 | published rates that insurers earn for their |
| 8 | In coming up with the estimate of the | 8 | entire country-wide operation. The reason |
| 9 | loss ratios, I'm going to go to Table 3 and | 9 | for that is each insurer will have an |
| 10 | 4 in the report. Again these are by | 10 | investment division, so all the investments |
| 11 | accident year, these are the loss ratios | 11 | that they have are managed and they would |
| 12 | that we have estimated based upon our review | 12 | earn return on investment rate on all that |
| 13 | using the data through to the first half of | 13 | pool of investments. We use that rate that |
| 14 | 2017 for the prior ten years, and more | 14 | is earned for the entire company, so the |
| 15 | recently we see an increase in the more | 15 | insurer is not earmarking investments, that |
| 16 | recent five years, an increasing loss ratio. | 16 | these investments are for personal property |
| 17 | We also in Table 4 below compare it to | 17 | in Alberta, and these investments are for |
| 18 | GISA's published estimate of the loss | 18 | personal property in BC , it's just one big |
| 19 | ratios. GISA's data that was available for | 19 | pool of investments. This is the rate that |
| 20 | this exhibit is based on the date through to | 20 | they earn on their total investment |
| 21 | the end of December, 2016, whereas the data | 21 | portfolio pre-tax. That's how our tables |
| 22 | that we had when we were completing this | 22 | are created. They are summary tables of the |
| 23 | report was more recent, an additional six | 23 | profit. |
| 24 | months of information, and the loss ratios | 24 | I'm going to move over to Part 2 of our |
| 25 | are fairly similar until we get to 2016, and | 25 | report, which starts on page 23 of the pdf |


|  | Page 9 |  | Page 11 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | accounting. | 1 | investment income, what we thought he loss |
| 2 | MS. KEAN: | 2 | ratio would be for those three years, and |
| 3 | Q. Page 19 in the paper copy. | 3 | then again calculate similar to Part 1 what |
| 4 | MASON, Q.C.: | 4 | we believed the resulting after tax return |
| 5 | Q. Thank you. | 5 | on equity would be for 2017, and we |
| 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 6 | estimated would be -9 percent. So that's |
| 7 | Q. In Table 11 in this worksheet page, we | 7 | the conclusion of my presentation. |
| 8 | present our estimate of what the required | 8 | MS. GLYNN: |
| 9 | average premium would be in hindsight | 9 | Q. Thank you, Ms. Elliott. Ms. Elliott's |
| 10 | looking at the information that's available | 10 | available for questions. |
| 11 | as at June 30th, 2017. We compare that to | 11 | CHAIR: |
| 12 | what the actual premium was and then what | 12 | Q. I understand, Mr. Gittens, you're going to |
| 13 | the dollar difference is, and in each of the | 13 | go first. |
| 14 | last five years our estimate of the required | 14 | ITTENS, Q.C.: |
| 15 | premium was lower than what the actual - I'm | 15 | Q. Mr. Mason will be going first. Thank you, |
| 16 | sorry, was higher than what the actual | 16 | Commissioner. |
| 17 | average premium was that was charged. In | 17 | CHAIR: |
| 18 | making our calculations, we use our estimate | 18 | Q. Okay. |
| 19 | of the losses, as we had discussed earlier | 19 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 20 | here this morning. We use the expense | 20 | Q. Madam Chair, thank you for the opportunity |
| 21 | ratios, as I showed you the table earlier | 21 | to cross-examine today. Ms. Elliott, you |
| 22 | here. We assume 10 percent after tax return | 22 | were retained by the Board to provide a |
| 23 | on equity as the provision for profit, and | 23 | fair, independent and thorough review of the |
| 24 | we assume a premium to surplus ratio of 2 to | 24 | profitability of auto insurers in this |
| 25 | 1. So for every dollar of premium, there is | 25 | province. Is that correct? |
|  | Page 10 |  | Page 12 |
| 1 | one dollar of equity or surplus capital. | 1 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 2 | Those terms are used interchangeably. We | 2 | A. Yes. |
| 3 | assume an investment rate pre-tax of 2.8 | 3 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 4 | percent, and based on our calculations this | 4 | Q. In fact, the retainment letter that I looked |
| 5 | is the estimate that we derived. | 5 | at said that you were to review and assess |
| 6 | (9:15 a.m.) | 6 | historic profit levels realized by auto |
| 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 7 | insurers in Newfoundland. That's what you |
| 8 | Q. Just to speak to Table 12 quickly on page | 8 | understood your role was today? Is that |
| 9 | 21, we talked about the operating expenses, | 9 | correct? |
| 10 | so this is the chart to just show the | 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 11 | breakout by component. The commissions is a | 11 | A. Correct. |
| 12 | large component, and premium taxes, general | 12 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 13 | expenses, that's really a catchall for all | 13 | Q. Right. And so, as you were reviewing the |
| 14 | the rent and salaries that are paid to the | 14 | profitability of auto insurers in |
| 15 | staff that are working on the private | 15 | Newfoundland, you sought out to - or sought |
| 16 | passenger auto policies. | 16 | evidence that both proved and disproved the |
| 17 | I'm going to go to Part 3, the premium | 17 | adequacy of rates in this province and the |
| 18 | rate level adequacy for 2017. So here what | 18 | profitability of insurers in this province? |
| 19 | we had, we were able to use - we used the | 19 | Is that right? |
| 20 | three prior fiscal accident years ending | 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 21 | June 30th, 2017, and projected those costs | 21 | A. Well, we measured what we believe in |
| 22 | forward to an average date of July 1st, 2017, | 22 | hindsight the profit was for various |
| 23 | and calculated what we believed, based on | 23 | accident - for the ten-year accident history |
| 24 | those losses that we're projecting, based on | 24 | that we had. |
| 25 | an assumption for the expense ratios, and | 25 | MASON, Q.C.: |

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Q. Right. But you did a little bit more than
        that, did you not? Did you not look at
        these figures and say "well, these seem
        reasonable. Those don't seem reasonable" in
        terms of let's say operating expenses and
        other data that's contained within the
        materials that we have before us?
    MS. ELLIOTT:
    A. Well, the operating expenses that we've
        stated are those that are - the data for
        expenses are each company is required to
        report them through to GISA. IBC compiles
        that and publishes that. So, we use that.
        The only exception to that that we made was
        in looking forward for 2017 with the change
        in the premium tax rate from four percent to
        five -
    MASON, Q.C.:
    Q. You increased it by . 5 percent, I think. Is
        that correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Yeah, I looked at that.
MS. ELLIOTT:
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A. That would be an assumption that we made; that that would be - should be not applied.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. We'll get into the operating expenses in a minute, but in terms of the operating expenses, while I've got you on that topic, what you did was you just reviewed the information that was provided by GISA. You didn't dig into it for reasonableness. Is that what you're telling me?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, we look at the history of the - well, we do look at it for reasonableness.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Okay.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Don't - but to be fair, if the reported expense ratio was 25 percent one year and 45 percent the next year that would cause me to investigate it. But they were all in the range that would be expected and comparable to other provinces.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. But did you see your role today - I want to go back to your role. Did you see your role

|  | Page 17 |  | Page 19 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | data, for example, operating expenses that | 1 | that was there. Is that correct? |
| 2 | were completely out of whack with previous | 2 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 3 | years, that's something you would raise with | 3 | A. I believe I was there with - |
| 4 | this Board to say "look, there's something | 4 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 5 | funny going on here that needs to be | 5 | Q. You didn't testify though, did you? |
| 6 | investigated", right? | 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 7 | A. I did not testify, no. |
| 8 | A. Well, not necessarily the Board because the | 8 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 9 | Board does not provide the data to us, but | 9 | Q. And it was Mr. Zubulake that produced the |
| 10 | if the data was provided to us that we felt | 10 | reports that were associated with that |
| 11 | was not right, then we would reach out to | 11 | hearing? Is that correct? |
| 12 | the people providing the data, which would | 12 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 13 | be GISA or IBC. | 13 | A. No, I would have been involved in all those |
| 14 | MASON, Q.C.: | 14 | reports. We would have worked together. |
| 15 | Q. So, you'd dig into it and then you would | 15 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 16 | report to the Board what was going on? Is | 16 | Q. You did? Okay. |
| 17 | that fair? | 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 18 | ELLIOTT: | 18 | A. Um-hm. |
| 19 | A. I would keep the Board apprised that I found | 19 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 20 | an issue with data and that I'm working with | 20 | Q. But Mr. Zubulake was the lead on those, I |
| 21 | whichever party to resolve it. | 21 | take it, was he? |
| 22 | MASON, Q.C.: | 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 23 | Q. Yeah, but you'd put it in your report a | 23 | A. He was my boss, yes. |
| 24 | well. If this was something that was | 24 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 25 | significant, you'd put it in your report so | 25 | Q. Right. And in 2008 when the constitutional |
|  | Page 18 |  | Page 20 |
| 1 | we could all review it, not just the Board, | 1 | challenge took place in Nova Scotia, it was |
| 2 | correct? | 2 | Mr. Zubulake that testified, not yourself, |
| 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 3 | on the adequacy of rates in the province? |
| 4 | A. Well, I guess if the data was resolved and | 4 | Isn't that correct? |
| 5 | fixed then it would depend upon the item, | 5 | S. ELLIOTT: |
| 6 | whether or not I put it in my report or not. | 6 | A. That's correct, and I was also involved in |
| 7 | MASON, Q.C.: | 7 | those reports. |
| 8 | Q. All right. You've mentioned that you've | 8 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 9 | been involved in doing automobile insurance | 9 | Q. All right, good. And in 2005 in Alberta, |
| 10 | reviews for many years. Is that right? | 10 | when they were doing a review on the |
| 11 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 11 | adequacy of rates, it was Mr. Zubulake that |
| 12 | A. Yes. | 12 | testified in that jurisdiction, not |
| 13 | MASON, Q.C.: | 13 | yourself, correct? |
| 14 | Q. All right. And in fact, I've seen your | 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 15 | reports before in different jurisdictions on | 15 | A. And I was again involved in those reports. |
| 16 | closed claim studies. You've done a number | 16 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 17 | of those. Is that correct? | 17 | Q. But you didn't testify, did you? |
| 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 19 | A. Correct. | 19 | A. That's correct. |
| 20 | MASON, Q.C.: | 20 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 21 | Q. Right. Now, what I haven't seen in the past | 21 | Q. And in 2010 when Nova Scotia carried out a |
| 22 | is I haven't seen you doing rate adequacy | 22 | utility review board hearing on the adequacy |
| 23 | review hearings before. For example, in | 23 | of rates in light of the new cap that was |
| 24 | 2002, when Nova Scotia had a rate review | 24 | being brought in place, it was Mr. Zubulake |
| 25 | hearing, it was Mr. Zubulake, not yourself, | 25 | that testified, not yourself, correct? |


|  | Page 21 |  | Page 23 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 1 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 2 | A. I did testify. | 2 | Q. Right. |
| 3 | MASON, Q.C.: | 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 4 | Q. You did testify at that hearing? | 4 | A. Every report that has been produced, we have |
| 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 5 | both - in Canada over the 20-year period, we |
| 6 | A. I did. | 6 | have worked on jointly. All the work |
| 7 | MASON, Q.C.: | 7 | product prepared by Oliver Wyman is peer |
| 8 | Q. All right. Was it Mr. Zubulake that | 8 | reviewed. So, yes, we've worked together. |
| 9 | testified with respect to rate adequacy? | 9 | He's a well-admired actuary and it was an |
| 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 10 | honour to work with him. |
| 11 | A. We were a panel on that. | 11 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 12 | MASON, Q.C.: | 12 | Q. Right. He was your boss? |
| 13 | Q. You were a panel, were you? | 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 | A. He was my boss. |
| 15 | A. We were together on that specifically. | 15 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 16 | MASON, Q.C.: | 16 | Q. Okay, thank you. Now, I've reviewed this, |
| 17 | Q. Was Mr. Zubulake the lead in that review | 17 | your report on rate adequacy in this |
| 18 | from Oliver Wyman's perspective? | 18 | province and the one thing that I'm |
| 19 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 19 | surprised I didn't see in your report is |
| 20 | A. Well, we were a panel. I think we bo | 20 | particularly with respect to the historical |
| 21 | responded. I can't recall exactly which - | 21 | data of rate adequacy in this province was |
| 22 | what each of us said at that hearing, but I | 22 | any kind of discussion or description of |
| 23 | definitely recall being at that hearing and | 23 | insurance cycles in Canada. |
| 24 | sitting side by side and testifying. | 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 25 | MASON, Q.C.: | 25 | A. Well, we're looking at the profitability of |
|  | Page 22 |  | Page 24 |
| 1 | Q. And I notice that Mr. Zubulake co-authored | 1 | the results over the last ten years that has |
| 2 | he report that's provided to this Board for | 2 | been presented. So, the reader can look at |
| 3 | today. Is that correct? | 3 | the Table 1, for example, and see the change |
| 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 4 | in the profit level over that ten-year |
| 5 | A. That's correct. | 5 | period. |
| 6 | MASON, Q.C.: | 6 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 7 | Q. And he's not here because he's retired? Is | 7 | Q. So, let me dig into that a little bit so we |
| 8 | that my understanding is correct? | 8 | know what we're talking about, okay? |
| 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 10 | A. He just retired, yes. | 10 | A. Sure. |
| 11 | MASON, Q.C.: | 11 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 12 | Q. I take it that you - you have great respect | 12 | Q. So, in insurance cycles, as I understand it, |
| 13 | for Mr. Zubulake and his opinions with | 13 | there are hard cycles or hard markets and |
| 14 | respect to rate adequacy applications that | 14 | soft markets. You understand that, correct? |
| 15 | he's done in the past? Is that fair? | 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 16 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 16 | A. Well, yes, a hard market is when it's more |
| 17 | A. I have great respect for all of Mr. | 17 | difficult to - premiums tend to be higher |
| 18 | Zubulake's work. | 18 | and more difficult to get insurance. |
| 19 | MASON, Q.C.: | 19 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 20 | Q. Right. He was a bit of a mentor to you, was | 20 | Q. And in hard markets, you see improving |
| 21 | he not, as you were working through these | 21 | profitability for insurers during hard |
| 22 | various projects from 2000 forward in Canada | 22 | markets, correct? As you're exiting a hard |
| 23 | on rate adequacy? | 23 | market going into a soft market, you see |
| 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 24 | improving profitability for insurers, |
| 25 | A. Well, we worked together for 20 years. | 25 | correct? |

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, it depends upon the situation, but if there's a change in the amount of premium being charged, such that there's more sufficient premium to pay for the losses and allow for expenses and a provision for profit, as that increases the amount of premium being charged, then you would expect that the reasonable provision for profit, if it was not there previously, would now begin to increase.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Yeah, but Oliver Wyman's looked at insurance cycles throughout Canada over the past 50 years, has talked about the kind of ups and downs of profitability of insurers throughout the country, correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Right. So, when there is insufficient premium, when the premium starts to increase to be sufficient to pay for the losses and expenses, then the amount of profit would start to perhaps go from negative to positive.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right. And so, there's times during the cycle that the insurers are quite profitable and other times when they're less profitable, correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Over - yes, well, in some areas, yes. It depends on how things are managed.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. And as you're presenting evidence to this Board, you want to capture the entire cycle so the people of this province can review and see how profitable auto insurers have been through a full cycle, right?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, we've presented ten years of profit, so -
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Well, wait a sec. You want to show the whole picture, do you not, about both very high profitability of insurers, auto insurers in this province, as well as the period of time that they're not quite as profitable?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, it wasn't my intent to go back to 1980
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5 A. - what the profit levels were at that time.
6 MASON, Q.C.:
7 Q. No, I got you on that.
8 MS. ELLIOTT:
9 A. Yeah.
10 MASON, Q.C.:
Q. But, in terms of the profitability, you wouldn't deliberately exclude, would you, from this Board evidence of high profitability during a cycle that would skew someone's view of how profitable auto insurers have been in this province, would you?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. No, I would not do that.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. No. Okay. And you'd agree with me, and I believe if we look at your report - and perhaps we'll go to that. There have been, over the last few years in this province, based on your analysis - just give me a
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. - what the profit levels were at that time.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. No, I got you on that.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yeah.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. But, in terms of the profitability, you
$\quad$ wouldn't deliberately exclude, would you,
from this Board evidence of high
profitability during a cycle that would skew
$\quad$ someone's view of how profitable auto
insurers have been in this province, would
MS. ELLIOTT:
No, I would not do that.
A.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. No. Okay. And you'd agree with me, and I
believe if we look at your report - and
perhaps we'll go to that. There have been,
over the last few years in this province,
based on your analysis - just give me a

Page 28
minute, I'll pull up the page for you. I'm looking at page two of your report and this is the return on equity that you've calculated for auto insurers in Newfoundland from 2007 to 2016.
(9:30 a.m.)
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. And as I understand your report, your view is that from 2007 to 2011 that auto insurers were achieving a reasonable rate of return as determined by some boards in this country, a ten percent return on equity. Is that right?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Correct.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Yeah. And if we are back in 2011, you would say, if you were before this Board, "look, doesn't look like there's a problem here. Looks like the industry is profitable. It's achieving a reasonable rate of return at ten percent return on equity", correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. 2012 and prior look reasonable, yes, yeah.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Sure. And so, the issue that you have as you're presenting in terms of rate adequacy in this province is from 2012 to 2016 where we see lower periods of - or lower amounts of return on equity. The insurers aren't quite as profitable. Is that correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Right. So, we have a mixture of some years that were good and it's moving to years that are not so good.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right. And we see from 2007 to 2011, return on equity ranging from 7 to 16 percent, yes?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. And was that the high part of a cycle, the most profitable period of the cycle for Newfoundland from 2007 to 2012?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, I think we're - over this period of time, the ten years that have been reviewed, the 16 percent is the high point over that

Page 30
ten years.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. No, I got you on that, but is that - you were going to look at - you wouldn't just focus on the lower portion of the cycle, the lower return on equity part of the cycle. You're going to look at the full cycle and does this represent the full cycle to you?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. This represents a very sufficient period of time to see that the insurance companies in one particular year have exceeded the target of ten percent.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Other years and certainly 2007, 2009, exceeded the ten percent. So, years that were below that, and then-but still positive and years that were negative. So, it's a good snapshot that they do not make consistently a target ten percent year in and year out.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yeah.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. And from your perspective, in terms of reasonableness and so on, it's not up to an insurer, it's not up to this Board looking at it that the insurers have to make ten percent each year. The idea is that they would make on average ten percent return on equity each year, right?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. The idea is that the ten percent after tax return on equity is a provision that is allowed in their rate application.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Yes, I've got you on that, but in terms of the adequacy of rates and the adequacy of profitability, as we sit here today, you're not suggesting that an insurer should have a basement, each year they have to make a ten percent return on equity? They may be years they make 8 , there may be years they make 12 , and that would suggest that there's reasonable profitability for the auto insurers during that time? Correct?

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Right, it would -

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Yes.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. It would be exceptional to be able to actually achieve the exact number that was targeted.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right, okay. So, in 2008 you said you were involved in the, at least the background of the constitutional challenge that took place in Nova Scotia, were involved in some of the data that was prepared that was filed as part of that constitutional challenge. Is that correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Okay. So, I have-this was an exhibit that was provided a few days ago which is titled "Nova Scotia Automobile Insurance Discussion Document."
MS. GLYNN:
Q. We'll mark this as Exhibit 5.

| Page 33 |  | Page 35 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 MASON, Q.C.: | 1 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 2 Q. That's actually the Board's decision. It | 2 | Q. And that translated, based on this report, |
| 3 should be "Nova Scotia Automobile Insurance | , | we know the cap came in on November 1st, |
| 4 Discussion Document: The Executive Summary." | 4 | 2003. So, we know most of the profits in |
| 5 MS. GLYNN: | 5 | Nova Scotia were earned before the cap came |
| 6 Q. Is this the correct document? | 6 | in place, is that correct? In 2003. |
| 7 MASON, Q.C.: | 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 8 Q. That's the correct one. | 8 | A. Yeah, well - |
| 9 MS. GLYNN: | 9 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 10 Q. Okay. | 10 | Q. That's a fair assumption, is it not? |
| 11 MASON, Q.C.: | 11 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 12 Q. Thank you. | 12 | A. Right. In 2003, as a result of the drop in |
| 13 MS. GLYNN: | 13 | frequency, the loss ration dropped |
| 14 Q. And we'll mark this as Exhibit 5. | 14 | materially. |
| 15 EXHIBIT ENTERED AT HEARING AND MARKED AS EXHIBIT N0.5 | 15 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 16 MASON, Q.C.: | 16 | Q. Right, right. |
| 17 Q. So, this was-was this a report that you were | 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 18 involved in, the--in preparing for part of | 18 | A. Yes. |
| 19 the constitutional challenge? | 19 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 20 MS. ELLIOTT: | 20 | Q. And so, did--as we'll get into this, we talk |
| 21 A. Yes. | 21 | about reserves. The reserves came down |
| 22 MASON, Q.C.: | 22 | significant-subsequently when we review |
| 23 Q. All right. And so, if we look at page 16, | 23 | them, correct? In Nova Scotia. |
| 24 Ms. Elliott, this is loss ratios for the | 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 25 four Atlantic Provinces from 2002 to 2007. | 25 | A. I don't have that in front of me to - |
| Page 34 |  | Page 36 |
| 1 Do you see that? | 1 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 2 MS. ELLIOTT: | 2 | Q. Okay. We'll look at that in a minute, okay? |
| 3 A. Yes, yeah. | 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 4 MASON, Q.C.: | 4 | A. Okay. Um-hm. |
| 5 Q. Okay. And we see in Nova Scotia-just so | 5 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 6 we're clear on this, when you have a 75 | 6 | Q. That's a separate topic. |
| 7 percent loss ratio, an insurer has a 75 | 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 8 percent loss ratio, that equates to | 8 | A. Yeah. |
| 9 approximately a ten percent return on | 9 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 10 equity, correct? | 10 | Q. My point simply is in 2003 in Nova Scotia |
| 11 MS. ELLIOTT: | 11 | where we see a 55 percent loss ratio, those |
| 12 A. In that range would be typical. | 12 | profits were earned primarily before the cap |
| 13 MASON, Q.C.: | 13 | came in place on November 1st, 2003, correct? |
| 14 Q. Right, okay. | 14 | That's a fair assessment? |
| 15 MS. ELLIOTT: | 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 16 A. Yeah. | 16 | A. Yes. |
| 17 MASON, Q.C.: | 17 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 18 Q. And so, in Nova Scotia we see some very | 18 | Q. Yes. |
| 19 healthy robust profits that are being made | 19 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 20 by auto insurers, both before the cap comes | 20 | A. That's true. |
| 21 in place and after the cap comes in place. | 21 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 22 Fifty-five percent loss ratio in 2003. Do | 22 | Q. And we know in 2003 at a 55 percent loss |
| 23 you see that? | 23 | ratio, if you go to page 12 of that report, |
| 24 MS. ELLIOTT: | 24 | we see 2003. We see a startling return-on- |
| 25 A. Um-hm. | 25 | equity figure of 32.9 percent? |


|  | Page 37 |  | $\text { Page } 39$ <br> mean, these are very significant profits |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 1 |  |  |
| 2 | A. Yes. | 2 |  | that are being earned by auto insurers in |
| 3 | MASON, Q.C.: | 3 |  | the province during that timeframe, correct? |
| 4 | Q. A scandalous amount of profit that's being | 4 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 5 | made by the auto insurance industry in Nova | 5 | A. | Yes, those loss ratios, and we discussed |
| 6 | Scotia before the cap came in place, | 6 |  | this yesterday, in terms of--there was an |
| 7 | correct? | 7 |  | unanticipated drop in the frequency rate. |
| 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 8 |  | We have the graph provided by IBC, and |
| 9 | A. I agree, that's very high. Yeah. | 9 |  | myself, Oliver Wyman, in our report, there |
| 10 | MASON, Q.C.: | 10 |  | was a very steep drop in 2002 in the |
| 11 | Q. Very high. Have you seen that? I know | 11 |  | frequency rate - |
| 12 | we've seen that in New Brunswick as well, a | 12 |  | N, Q.C.: |
| 13 | very high loss ratios, because we see in New | 13 | Q. | Right. |
| 14 | Brunswick after their cap came in place, 47 | 14 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 15 | percent in 2004. Sorry, if we go back to | 15 | A. | - in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, and |
| 16 | page 16 of the documentation. If you look | 16 |  | also, following their introduction of the |
| 17 | in the column under New Brunswick, we see, | 17 |  | reform that wasn't anticipated. And we |
| 18 | sorry, 2004, 42 percent loss ratio. We're | 18 |  | talked about, you know, it's hard to explain |
| 19 | probably talking, what, a return on equity | 19 |  | why the frequency rate dropped before the |
| 20 | in excess of 40 percent? | 20 |  | reforms very steeply, and after the reforms. |
| 21 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 21 |  | And as a result of that, not being |
| 22 | A. You know, the 42 percent loss ratio is 2004 | 22 |  | anticipated, this massive drop, the premiums |
| 23 | is, well, very low. | 23 |  | didn't-that were set in 2002 that would be |
| 24 | MASON, Q.C.: | 24 |  | paid in 2003, the-you know, the rate setting |
| 25 | Q. Right. | 25 |  | is prior to that. |
|  | Page 38 |  |  | Page 40 |
| 1 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 1 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 2 | A. And so, as a result, they had very high | 2 | Q. | Right. |
| 3 | profits in those years, yeah. | 3 |  | ELLIOTT: |
| 4 | MASON, Q.C.: | 4 | A. | It didn't anticipate this massive drop in |
| 5 | Q. Yes. And we didn't see a real significant | 5 |  | frequency either before the introduction of |
| 6 | corresponding reduction in premiums in those | 6 |  | the reform, as well as after the |
| 7 | provinces, did we, during that timeframe? | 7 |  | introduction of reform, and a continual |
| 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 8 |  | decline in the frequency rate. |
| 9 | A. Well, with loss ratios that low, the | 9 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 10 | subsequent year it was not causing the loss | 10 | Q. | Yes. |
| 11 | ratio to increase. Correct. | 11 |  | ELLIOTT: |
| 12 | MASON, Q.C.: | 12 | A. | And as a result of that, the loss ratios |
| 13 | Q. I'm sorry, I didn't follow that. | 13 |  | plummeted. |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 15 | A. Well, if the loss ratio is to increase, that | 15 | Q. | Right. |
| 16 | could be a result of two things; either | 16 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 17 | reduction in premium or an increase in | 17 |  | And it was unexpected. |
| 18 | losses. | 18 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 19 | MASON, Q.C.: | 19 | Q. | So, really what was happening was the |
| 20 | Q. All right. Well, let's use Nova Scotia as | 20 |  | reserves that were being held by insurers in |
| 21 | an example in terms of the premium reduction | 21 |  | 2002, 2003, 2004, et cetera, were too high, |
| 22 | because we see, if we go through Nova Scotia | 22 |  | correct? |
| 23 | on the document we're looking at right now, | 23 |  | ELLIOTT: |
| 24 | we see 55 percent loss ratio in 2003, 54 | 24 | A. | No, each accident year we're looking at |
| 25 | percent in 2004, 53 percent in 2005. I | 25 |  | here, specifically what the estimate is for |


|  | Page 41 | e 43 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | that accident year, and much of this drop in | 1 |  | the Board's review and approval of |
| 2 | the loss ratio is due to a situation where | 2 |  | automobile insurance rates charged in the |
| 3 | the premiums were higher than required, for | 3 |  | province, at the end of 2004 following an |
| 4 | course. | 4 |  | average premium increase of 23.5 percent in |
| 5 | MASON, Q.C.: | 5 |  | ' 02, , and this is the part that I want you |
| 6 | Q. Right. | 6 |  | to focus on, "premiums rose on average by |
| 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 7 |  | 4.1 percent in 2003." So, premiums went up |
| 8 | A. And they were set on a basis of a frequency | 8 |  | in 2003 when insurers were sitting on a 32.9 |
| 9 | being here. | 9 |  | percent return on equity? |
| 10 | MASON, Q.C.: | 10 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 11 | Q. Right. | 11 | A. | Well, the-in terms of the premiums |
| 12 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 12 |  | increasing in 2003 - |
| 13 | A. But in fact, it was down there. | 13 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 14 | MASON, Q.C.: | 14 | Q. | Right. |
| 15 | Q. Okay, all right. Let me get back to my | 15 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 16 | point here. The initial point is that with | 16 | A. | - those calculations were premiums that will |
| 17 | loss ratios of 55 percent, 54 percent, 53 | 17 |  | be sold. |
| 18 | percent and 56 percent in Nova Scotia from | 18 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 19 | 2003 to 2006, in terms of profit over and | 19 | Q. | I've got you. |
| 20 | above 10 percent return on equity, we're | 20 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 21 | talking hundreds of millions of dollars, | 21 | A. | They're done in 2002 using data from 2001. |
| 22 | aren't we? | 22 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 23 | Q. | I bet, sure. |
| 24 | A. In Nova Scotia - | 24 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 25 | MASON, Q.C.: | 25 | A. | And with that, the information regarding the |
|  | Page 42 |  |  | Page 44 |
| 1 | Q. In Nova Scotia, yes. | 1 |  | massive drop in frequency when we look at |
| 2 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 2 |  | the chart from IBC - |
| 3 | A. - and New Brunswick, I don't know the dollar | 3 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 4 | amount, but it would be well in excess of a | 4 |  | We'll come to that. |
| 5 | ten percent target as we refer to it. | 5 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 6 | MASON, Q.C.: | 6 | A. | - that information was not available. |
| 7 | Q. Right. | 7 |  | N, Q.C.: |
| 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 8 | Q. | Right, okay. |
| 9 | A. Yes. | 9 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 10 | MASON, Q.C.: | 10 | A. | Yeah. |
| 11 | Q. It could be in the hundreds of millions of | 11 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 12 | dollars, couldn't it? Over and above the | 12 | Q. | So, then it says they declined by 3.4 |
| 13 | ten percent return on equity. | 13 |  | percent in 2004. Do you see that? |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 15 | A. Likely. | 15 | A. | Um-hm. |
| 16 | MASON, Q.C.: | 16 |  | N, Q.C.: |
| 17 | Q. Yes. | 17 | Q. | And we know from the returns on equity in |
| 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 18 |  | Nova Scotia that the return in equity in |
| 19 | A. Yeah. | 19 |  | Nova Scotia was over, was 30. I think it |
| 20 | MASON, Q.C.: | 20 |  | was 30 percent in 2004. And rates went down |
| 21 | Q. And so, if we go to page 7 of this report, | 21 |  | by 3.4 percent. Then, in 2005, declined by |
| 22 | this is the report that you worked on with | 22 |  | 6.2 percent, and declined by 2.3 percent in |
| 23 | Mr. Zubulake. And you'll see in the top | 23 |  | ' 06 , and declined by .7 percent in 2007. I |
| 24 | paragraph, "As a result of the freeze, the | 24 |  | aggregated that to 8.5 percent over that |
| 25 | mandated 20 percent rate level reduction, | 25 |  | five-year period, an 8.5 percent reduction |


|  | Page 45 |  | Page 47 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | in premiums over that five-year period. So, | 1 | offices, presumably on your company server, |
| 2 | what we see is we see auto insurers in Nova | 2 | showing the profitability of auto insurers |
| 3 | Scotia over that timeframe making hundreds | 3 | in Newfoundland from 2002 to 2007? |
| 4 | of millions of dollars in excess profits, | 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 5 | over and above the reasonable rate of | 5 | A. These are the loss ratios. |
| 6 | return, a ten percent return in equity, and | 6 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 7 | reducing premiums by 8.5 percent over a five | 7 | Q. Right, got you on that. |
| 8 | -year period? | 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 9 | A. Yeah, um-hm. |
| 10 | A. Um-hm. | 10 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 1 | MASON, Q.C.: | 11 | Q. And we'll talk about returns on equity in a |
| 12 | Q. Is that accurate? | 12 | minute, but with a click of the mouse, this |
| 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 13 | data could have been brought into this |
| 14 | A. Yes, what you're stating would be accurate, | 14 | hearing, correct? |
| 15 | yes. | 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 16 | MASON, Q.C.: | 16 | A. Well, it is actually. It's right here now. |
| 17 | Q. Well, okay. So, if I understand the deal in | 17 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 18 | Nova Scotia, accident victims | 18 | Q. Oh, it's here now, but you-it was the Trial |
| 19 | (unintelligible) a cap was imposed on them, | 19 | Lawyers Association that had to bring it |
| 20 | auto insurers made hundreds of millions of | 20 | here; not the independent watchdog as I |
| 21 | dollars in excess of the ten percent return | 21 | would call you, Ms. Zubulake (sic.), who is |
| 22 | on equity, and consumers received an 8.5 | 22 | supposed to be providing this information to |
| 23 | percent reduction in premiums over that | 23 | the Board. |
| 24 | timeframe. That was the deal? | 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 25 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 25 | A. My name is Ms. Elliott. |
|  | Page 46 |  | Page 48 |
| 1 | A. I'm not sure if I'd reference it as a deal. | 1 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 2 | MASON, Q.C.: | 2 | Q. Sorry, Ms. Elliott. |
| 3 | Q. All right. | 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 4 | A. And I'm not a watchdog. |
| 5 | A. But that's what occurred. | 5 | (9:45 a.m.) |
| 6 | MASON, Q.C.: | 6 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 7 | Q. Okay. Let's go to Newfoundland and | 7 | Q. Okay, fair enough, but in terms of doing an |
| 8 | Labrador. Look at page 16 of the-of this | 8 | independent and thorough review, why didn't |
| 9 | chart. And this was data, Ms. Elliott, that | 9 | you provide this documentation? |
| 10 | you had presumably on your company server at | 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 11 | Oliver Wyman as you were preparing for this | 11 | A. Well, I think that what we have provided |
| 12 | hearing for today, correct? This data from | 12 | gives a good snapshot to the Board. |
| 13 | Newfoundland and Labrador. | 13 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 | Q. Yes. |
| 15 | A. Yes, sorry. Let me catch up with you there. | 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 16 | MASON, Q.C.: | 16 | A. That companies have earned higher than your |
| 17 | Q. It's page 16. | 17 | target provision that is allowed in this |
| 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 18 | province, the after-tax ten percent ROE. |
| 19 | A. Yeah, okay. Um-hm. | 19 | The fact that they would have earned higher |
| 20 | MASON, Q.C.: | 20 | returns in the past and have subsequently |
| 21 | Q. Do you have that? | 21 | managed the process through the rate filing |
| 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 22 | process such that those returns have not |
| 23 | A. Um-hm. | 23 | been in the last ten years in excess of the |
| 24 | MASON, Q.C.: | 24 | 30 percent and whatnot that you have quoted, |
| 25 | Q. This was data that you had at your company | 25 | they have now a snapshot of what has |


|  | $\text { Page } 49$ |  | $\text { Page } 51$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | occurred in the last ten years. | 1 | that in 2002 automobile insurers were making |
| 2 | MASON, Q.C.: | 2 | maybe 11 percent return on equity, that |
| 3 | Q. Right. | 3 | would be a fair estimate based on the 72 |
| 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 4 | percent loss ratio, correct? |
| 5 | A. To look back and say that the companies made | 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 6 | profits that would have been higher than | 6 | A. That's in the ballpark, yeah. |
| 7 | that in 2003 and ' 04 and ' 05 and ' 06 , that | 7 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 8 | is water under the bridge. | 8 | Q. Right, sure. In 2003, we see a loss ratio |
| 9 | MASON, Q.C.: | 9 | of 63 percent. Do you have a guess for me |
| 10 | Q. Oh, okay. | 10 | on what the return on equity is for |
| 11 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 11 | Newfoundland in 2003 at a 63 percent loss |
| 12 | A. Yeah. Yeah, that - | 12 | ratio? |
| 13 | MASON, Q.C.: | 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 14 | Q. I'm going to have to stop you | 14 | A. Likely higher than 10 percent. |
| 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 15 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 16 | A. They have earned those-that has occurred | 16 | Q. Well we know that, thank you, that's not |
| 17 | The claims occurred, the premiums were | 17 | terribly helpful, but do you have an idea |
| 18 | collected, and that was what was achieved in | 18 | what the number is? |
| 19 | that timeframe. It's-you know, the | 19 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 20 | information is available. I do not believe | 20 | A. Not off the top of my head. |
| 21 | that we have misled the Board or the public | 21 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 22 | in any manner whatsoever with presenting the | 22 | Q. Could it be 20 percent? |
| 23 | results for ten years. We do indicate in | 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 24 | our report that the results that have been | 24 | A. I haven't done the math, I'm not doing it on |
| 25 | achieved are not intended to mean that the | 25 | the spot right now. |
|  | Page 50 |  | Page 52 |
| 1 | same results would have been achieved in any | 1 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 2 | prior period. It's a reflection of ten | 2 | Q. Right. And a 58 percent loss ratio in 2004, |
| 3 | years. | 3 | do you see that? |
| 4 | MASON, Q.C.: | 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 5 | Q. Here's my problem, I have to tell you. | 5 | A. Yes. |
| 6 | asked you, "Are you going"-or "Was it your | 6 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 7 | mandate to do a thorough review of auto | 7 | Q. All right, so we know a 55 percent loss |
| 8 | insurance in this province, and you said, | 8 | ratio in Nova Scotia equated to a 32.9 |
| 9 | "Yes." I said that you would want to get a | 9 | percent return on equity. Is it fair to say |
| 10 | full picture of a full cycle so that you | 10 | that a 58 percent loss ratio in Newfoundland |
| 11 | could establish the profitability of auto | 11 | would equate to a 30 percent return on |
| 12 | insurers in Newfoundland. | 12 | equity? |
| 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 14 | A. Um-hm. | 14 | A. Likely they would be similar, there are |
| 15 | MASON, Q.C.: | 15 | differences in tax rates, differences in |
| 16 | Q. I believe you said yes to that | 16 | operating expenses, but likely similar and |
| 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 17 | definitely higher than 10 percent. |
| 18 | Q. Um-hm. | 18 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 19 | MASON, Q.C.; | 19 | Q. Right, and the same with 2005 and 2006, 66 |
| 20 | Q. This data, let's go through it, okay, | 20 | percent loss ratios, 67 percent loss ratios, |
| 21 | because we've got a 72 percent loss ratio in | 21 | much higher than a 10 percent return on |
| 22 | Newfoundland and Labrador in 2002. We | 22 | equity, correct? |
| 23 | discussed previously that a 75 percent loss | 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 24 | ratio would equate to approximately a 10 | 24 | A. Depending upon the expense ratios, but yeah. |
| 25 | percent return on equity. I'd suggest to you | 25 | MASON, Q.C.: |

Q. We'll look at those in a minute too. So as we look through these figures, these would be record profits. If we were looking at the chart that you presented in-that you chose to present from 2007 to 2016, these profit figures would far exceed what the profits that were earned between 2007 and 2016, correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, that is correct, but you know, we do appreciate that insurance companies don't go back and say "I made these profits for this particular year, the losses were less than anticipated for the premiums that were charged", and use those past, rate making is prospective, so we want to use the loss experience for the past to help predict the future, but companies, like, they don't go back to their historical profits that have been achieved.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. I know the companies don't.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Right, and use those going forward, yeah.

MASON, Q.C.:
Page 54
Q. But my question is why didn't you look at these figures and present it to this Board today?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, we chose to present 10 years. My intention was not to, in any manner, we felt that and we still do, believe that the 10 years was a good snapshot to look at what's happened and not go back to a longer period.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Let me ask you a similar question to what I threw out about Nova Scotia from 2003 to 2007, I said over and above the 10 percent return on equity, we're probably talking hundreds of millions of dollars in profit. I see a similar trend in Newfoundland. Are we talking a hundred, a hundred and fifty million dollars in Newfoundland in profit that was earned between 2002 and 2006, to what was being earned in Nova Scotia?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. If you know the number that we've stated as Oliver Wyman in this report, you can point us to it, but I don't have that at my fingertips. In this exhibit, we have
presented six years of data and in this that you have on our screen here and discussing, in the report that we presented for this hearing, we presented 10 years of data, so, you know, we presented more data than in this exhibit that we're discussing here, you know, and definitely the loss ratios were lower over this period going from 2007 to 2002, that's a statement of fact, yeah.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Well I got you on that, but I mean, you're our expert here that is trying to help us to figure out what's going on in Newfoundland and so what I'm asking you is can you give me an estimate of what, in terms of money that was earned by auto insurers in Newfoundland between 2002 and 2006, because that's the period that was not included in your report, how much money was earned by auto insurers during that timeframe over and above the 10 percent reasonable rate of return that's been established by this Board and some others?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes, I mean, I don't have the number in
front of me and I'm not prepared to stop the hearing to do an hour's calculation for you. So I don't have it, I don't have the number in front of me.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. All right, well let me ask you this because you did say in Nova Scotia it was likely in excess of a hundred million dollars, correct? The over and above the 10 percent return on equity, it was likely in excess of a hundred million dollars, right?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Uh-hm.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. And so we can assume, without you doing your calculation for an hour, we can assume that there were similar results in Newfoundland, in terms of profit that would be over and above that 10 percent return, correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. We know that it would be over 10 percent return on equity, I don't know the dollar amount.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. No, sorry, in terms of the profits that were

|  | Page 57 |  | Page 59 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | earned by auto insurers in Newfoundland over | 1 | the cycle in Newfoundland in terms of auto |
| 2 | and above the 10 percent return on equity, | 2 | insurance profitability, and my question is, |
| 3 | we can assume, can we not, that the numbers | 3 | is the reason that this was not provided |
| 4 | would be similar to Nova Scotia, it would be | 4 |  |
| 5 | in excess of a hundred - | 5 | McLennan, one of the world's largest - |
| 6 | ELLIOTT: | 6 | ELLIOTT: |
| 7 | A. I don't know what the numbers are, I don't | 7 | A. No, - |
| 8 | have it in front of me and I'm not prepared | 8 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 9 | to give you a number that I'm not able to | 9 | Q. Just a second, let me finish my question, |
| 10 | calculate on the spot, so we're in agreement | 10 | one of the world's largest reinsurers that |
| 11 | with these loss ratios that are presented. | 11 | relies on insurance companies, like Intact |
| 12 | The return would be over 10 percent, you | 12 | and Aviva, for business? |
| 13 | know, point stop. After that, if you want a | 13 | S. ELLIOTT: |
| 14 | dollar amount, I'm unprepared, unable to do | 14 | A. Marsh \& McLennan is not a reinsurer, to |
| 15 | it on the spot for you here. | 15 | begin with, and my report was presented with |
| 16 | SON, Q.C.: | 16 | integrity to present the data, the |
| 17 | Q. All right. Where did that money go? | 17 | experience for the last 10 years, there was |
| 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 18 | definitely no intention to misrepresent |
| 19 | A. Where did the money go | 19 | anything to the Board or to the public. It |
| 20 | MASON, Q.C.: | 20 | was provided to show the experience and the |
| 21 | Q. Yeah, in Newfoundland, where did that money, | 21 | profits over the last 10 years. That was |
| 22 | over and above the 10 percent return on | 22 | that. No intention to mislead or hide any |
| 23 | equity, where did it go? | 23 | information. |
| 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 24 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 25 | A. The insurance companies would retain any of | 25 | Q. All right. Marsh \& McLennan is-sorry, |
|  | Page 58 |  | Page 60 |
| 1 | the earnings. | 1 |  |
| 2 | SON, Q.C.: | 2 | McLennan, is that correct? |
| 3 | Q. Right, they put it in their back pocket, | 3 | ELLIOTT: |
| 4 | right? | 4 | A. We're a separate operating company within |
| 5 | ELLIOTT: | 5 | the - |
| 6 | A. Well, front, back, I'm not sure | 6 | ASON, Q.C.: |
| 7 | MASON, Q.C.: | 7 | Q. Got you on that. You're the child of the |
| 8 | Q. Yeah, okay, fair enough. And so they get to | 8 | parent company, is that fair? |
| 9 | keep their money over and above the 10 | 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 10 | percent return on equity from 2002 to 2006, | 10 | A. That's a terminology you can use, sure. |
| 11 | yet accident victims in 2017 have to give up | 11 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 12 | their rights when there may be, they may be | 12 |  |
| 13 | and we're going to talk about this in a | 13 | McLennan is not a reinsurer, perhaps I |
| 14 | minute, may be making less than a 10 percent | 14 | misspoke on that, they're into insurance |
| 15 | return on equity, is that your evidence | 15 | broking, insurance program management |
| 16 | today? | 16 | services, is that correct? |
| 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 18 | A. Well, my evidence today is regarding the | 18 | A. That's correct. |
| 19 | profit levels that have been achieved over | 19 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 20 | the last 10 years, which is a-that's what | 20 | Q. So they deal with companies like Intact and |
| 21 | our report is a presentation of. | 21 | Aviva and other insurers that operate out of |
| 22 | MASON, Q.C.: | 22 | this province across the country and across |
| 23 | Q. Ms. Elliott, I must say, I'm troubled that | 23 | the world, right? |
| 24 | this information wasn't provided to the | 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 25 | Board because it provides a full picture of | 25 | A. Yeah, it's completely a separate operation |


|  | Page 61 |  | Page 63 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | from the work that Oliver Wyman, the | 1 | review of insurers that have a profitable |
| 2 | actuaries, do. | 2 | relationship with the parent company. I |
| 3 | MASON, Q.C.: | 3 | just want to make sure I got it correct. |
| 4 | Q. No, that wasn't my question, but that's what | 4 | . ELLIOTT: |
| 5 | they do, don't they? | 5 | Q. Well, I think what should be correct and |
| 6 | ELLIOTT: | 6 | that you should get correct is that I have |
| 7 | A. Well that was my answer. Yes, that's | 7 | been doing this work for Oliver Wyman for |
| 8 | correct. | 8 | more than 20 years. My integrity has never |
| 9 | SON, Q.C.: | 9 | been questioned in terms of presenting bias |
| 10 | Q. Right, okay. So Marsh \& McLennan relies on | 10 | in any manner in our reports. We prepare |
| 1 | insurance companies in this province for | 11 | the reports as thoroughly, completely and |
| 12 | business, correct? | 12 | accurately and independently as we believe |
| 13 | ELLIOTT: | 13 | possible and appropriate. And I have no |
| 14 | A. Yes, that's correct. | 14 | relationship whatsoever with any company, |
| 15 | MASON, Q.C.: | 15 | insurance companies or any concern of what |
| 16 | Q. So, I asked you at the beginning of | 16 | Marsh \& McLennan might be doing for any of |
| 17 | year that your role was to provide | 17 | its clients. |
| 18 | independent and thorough review | 18 | ASON, Q.C.: |
| 19 | automobile insurance in this province | 19 | Q. I'm going to get to that. |
| 20 | you tell me why you didn't disclose that | 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 21 | little nugget to us? | 21 | Q. Completely independent. |
| 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 22 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 23 | A. I'm sorry, which little nugg | 23 | Q. But that's not an answer to my question. |
| 24 | MASON, Q.C.: | 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 25 | Q. Sorry, that Oliver Wyman is owned by Marsh \& | 25 | Q. Well, I hope that thorough enough to, for |
|  | Page 62 |  | Page 64 |
| 1 | McLennan who does business with the auto | 1 | all the parties to understand that my work |
| 2 | insurers that you're reviewing today? | 2 | is independent and I do not do anything, |
| 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 3 | present any reports, I am not influenced in |
| 4 | A. I think that's publicly available, it's very | 4 | any manner whatsoever by any operation |
| 5 | clear in our report with our logo that we're | 5 | that's ongoing in Marsh \& McLennan. |
| 6 | part of the Marsh \& McLennan Group, that is | 6 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 7 | no secret to anybody, certainly any of my | 7 | Q. Ms. Elliott, this is going to be long day |
| 8 | arrangements that I have with my clients | 8 | because I just want an answer to my |
| 9 | across the country, our clients are fully | 9 | question. The question I put to you was |
| 10 | aware of the Marsh \& McLennan operation. As | 10 | simply this, we have the subsidiary of a |
| 11 | an actuary, myself, and Ted, who is now | 11 | parent company doing a fair independent and |
| 12 | retired, Ted Zubulake, we do not do any work | 12 | thorough investigation of insurers that have |
| 13 | for insurance companies, any work for the | 13 | a profitable relationship with the parent |
| 14 | Insurance Bureau of Canada, GISA, any | 14 | company. That's what I just want to |
| 15 | entity, all our clients are regulators | 15 | understand. Do you agree with that? |
| 16 | across Canada. We keep a very, you know, | 16 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 17 | distant operation that is strictly focussed | 17 | Q. Well, the profits that Oliver Wyman would |
| 18 | on automobile regulation and do not do any | 18 | make, like any subsidiary, roll up to the |
| 19 | work at all, in any manner, for insurance | 19 | parent company. |
| 20 | companies. | 20 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 21 | MASON, Q.C.: | 21 | Q. Alright, so there we go, okay. So, we've |
| 22 | Q. I'll get to that, but we have-just so I' | 22 | got money that's going from Oliver Wyman to |
| 23 | clear on this, we have the subsidiary of a | 23 | the parent company. The parent company has |
| 24 | parent company doing an investigation, | 24 | a relationship with the insurance companies. |
| 25 | right, or a review, an independent thorough | 25 | And now we have the subsidiary company |


|  | Page 65 | Page 67 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | investigating, doing a thorough and | 1 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 2 | independent investigation for the people of | 2 | Q. | Right. And so in terms of company |
| 3 | this province of the insurance companies | 3 |  | executives, their salaries would be included |
| 4 | that deal with the parent. | 4 |  | within the operating expenses, is that |
| 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 5 |  | right? |
| 6 | Q. Yes, and that would be the same situation as | 6 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 7 | you raised earlier for all the various | 7 | Q. | Yes, there would be an overhead, head office |
| 8 | reports and testifying at various hearings | 8 |  | overhead might be a terminology for that for |
| 9 | that you've been in attendance with with Mr. | 9 |  | all the IT, actuaries, accountants, yes. |
| 10 | Zubulake and myself in the Atlantic | 10 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 11 | provinces and in other provinces in this | 11 | Q. | And that would include any bonuses that are |
| 12 | country. The same issue has arisen | 12 |  | paid to executives based on the |
| 13 | questioning whether we're independent. I | 13 |  | profitability of insurance throughout the |
| 14 | believe that's it's been established that | 14 |  | country, is that right? That would be part |
| 15 | through the quality of our work and what we | 15 |  | of the expenses that are paid by premium |
| 16 | do, that we are independent. | 16 |  | holders of this province - |
| 17 | (10:00 a.m.) | 17 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 18 | MASON, Q.C.: | 18 | Q. | Yeah. |
| 19 | Q. So maybe what we should have is we should | 19 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 20 | have Donald Jr. investigating the Russians | 20 |  | - as part of the operating expenses, right? |
| 21 | with respect to the collusion arguments with | 21 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 22 | Donald, Sr., maybe that's the same thing. | 22 | Q. | Yes, that would be allocated across all |
| 23 | CHAIR: | 23 |  | lines of business, yes, all provinces. |
| 24 | Q. Mr. Mason, Mr. Mason, please | 24 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 25 | MASON, Q.C.: | 25 | Q. | And it would include as well monies that are |
|  | Page 66 |  |  | Page 68 |
| 1 | Q. Let me talk to you about operating expenses. | 1 |  | paid by the insurance companies of this |
| 2 | This is one of the critical factors that | 2 |  | province, by the premium holders who pay the |
| 3 | goes into pricing and premiums and return on | 3 |  | insurance companies of this province monies |
| 4 | equities, are the operating expenses that | 4 |  | to the IBC, to lobby on their behalf, |
| 5 | are being charged by auto insurers in this | 5 |  | correct? |
| 6 | province, correct? | 6 |  | LIOTT: |
| 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 7 | Q. | Yes, there's-that would be included as a |
| 8 | Q. Yes. | 8 |  | cost, that's correct. |
| 9 | MASON, Q.C.: | 9 |  | N, Q.C.: |
| 10 | Q. And you described earlier that operating | 10 |  | And any bonuses that are paid to Mr. |
| 11 | expenses are comprised of broker conditions | 11 |  | Forgeron, for example, if he's successful in |
| 12 | that are paid and premium taxes that are | 12 |  | getting a cap on pain and suffering awards |
| 13 | paid, you described that. And there are | 13 |  | in this province, that would be the kind of |
| 14 | other operating expenses you mentioned as | 14 |  | expense that auto insurers in this province |
| 15 | well, correct? | 15 |  | as part of their operating expenses. |
| 16 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 16 |  | LIOTT: |
| 17 | Q. Correct. | 17 |  | I'm not familiar with IBC - |
| 18 | MASON, Q.C.: | 18 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 19 | Q. Right. And you mentioned that the cost of | 19 | Q. | Madam Chair, this is getting very boring, I |
| 20 | doing business, so the cost to pay salaries, | 20 |  | must say. |
| 21 | for rent, cost of doing business within the | 21 |  | E, Q.C.: |
| 22 | province is something that's included within | 22 |  | I don't find it boring. |
| 23 | those operating expenses, is that correct? | 23 |  | P, Q.C.: |
| 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 24 | Q. | The issue that we're focussed on here is |
| 25 | Q. Right. | 25 |  | consultative process to try and understand |


|  | Page 69 |  | Page 71 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | what these expenses would be. It doesn't | 1 | do your calculations. This is important and |
| 2 | have to throw rocks. That's not what we are | 2 | relevant evidence and I would suggest that |
| 3 | here for; this is not a cross examination. | 3 | he should be allowed to continue. |
| 4 | Ms. Elliott is not even sworn. I think that |  | AIZE, Q.C.: |
| 5 | the approach to take is to try and | 5 | Q. Also, I have to reiterate, our function |
| 6 | understand the background. We know that | 6 | here, as an Intervenor, we want to hear this |
| 7 | there is a connection between Oliver Wyman | 7 | information because the victims are the ones |
| 8 | and Mercer, whatever the name of that firm | 8 | paying the price for this cap or deductible. |
| 9 | is, but the world knows that. | 9 | And the profits generated by the insurance |
| 10 | SON, Q.C.: | 10 | companies in relation to the return is very |
| 1 | Q. So, Madam Chair, if I may speak to that, | 11 | relevant to us. If you're taking away |
| 12 | there's been no independent review of the | 12 | rights from someone, they need the chance to |
| 13 | expenses, operating expenses by Ms. Elliott | 13 | hear what is going on. So, I think we have |
| 14 | as I think we're going to establish here in | 14 | to keep proceeding the way we are, otherwise |
| 15 | a minute. What comprises those operating | 15 | we're not going to get a true picture and |
| 16 | expenses, I think, is highly relevant. It's | 16 | that would be unfair to the victims. |
| 17 | one of the critical factors in determining | 17 | CHAIR: |
| 18 | what are appropriate terms of rates in this | 18 | Q. Mr. Browne, do you have anything you wish to |
| 19 | province? What is the appropriate terms of | 19 | add to this? |
| 20 | a return on equity? It's part of the | 20 | ROWNE, Q.C.: |
| 21 | calculation. | 21 | Q. No, I don't. In terms of the questioning |
| 22 | CHAIR: | 22 | and some of the questioning, suspicion and |
| 23 | Q. Does anyone else want to weigh in on this? | 23 | innuendo can only go so far. If there's |
| 24 | KENNEDY, Q.C.: | 24 | hard evidence to bring forward to undermine |
| 25 | Q. Yes, I do, Madam Chair. Although we're not | 25 | or to reject or suggest that the evidence |
|  | Page 70 |  | Page 72 |
| 1 | in a courtroom, one of the issues you have | 1 | should be rejected, please bring it forward. |
| 2 | to look at in examining weight or how you're | 2 | Dropping suspicion on the character of the |
| 3 | going to look at an expert's evidence is the | 3 | expert witness, I don't think is appropriate |
| 4 | level of independence or the potential for | 4 | unless you have facts to back it up. That's |
| 5 | bias. Although we're not in a courtroom | 5 | my comment. |
| 6 | right now-we could be. So, therefore we | 6 | HAIR: |
| 7 | have to lay, at some future point, so we | 7 | Q. Thank you. We were going to take a short |
| 8 | have to lay the record that is necessary to | 8 | break. We're going to take our break now, |
| 9 | show that an expert is not independent but | 9 | 15 minutes. |
| 10 | is potentially biased. So, we've spent the | 10 | (BREAK 10:06 a.m.) |
| 11 | week trying to outline the problems with the | 11 | (RESUME - 10:27 a.m.) |
| 12 | report and the lack of independence. The | 12 | CHAIR: |
| 13 | points being made by Mr. Mason go to that | 13 | Q. Okay, before we continue I do have one |
| 14 | independence. You may say it's an | 14 | issue. It appears to us that there has been |
| 15 | information hearing and people may refer to | 15 | issue of independence raised with respect to |
| 16 | her as Paula, but for the rate payers of | 16 | Ms. Elliott and while we've allowed the |
| 17 | this province, for the victim of accidents, | 17 | issue to be canvassed, I'm not prepared to |
| 18 | they're very interested in hearing all of | 18 | let that proceed. And if there's anything |
| 19 | this. So, I would suggest to you that this | 19 | else that the Atlantic Provinces Trial |
| 20 | is very relevant information. The witness, | 20 | Lawyers Association would like to raise with |
| 21 | again, the body language of the witness is | 21 | respect to that, it will have to be done in |
| 22 | not going to show up on the transcript. | 22 | the way of a formal motion with supporting |
| 23 | She's very defensive. She's-in fact, some | 23 | documentation evidence and we'll deal with |
| 24 | of the questions, her answers to Mr. Mason, | 24 | it. |
| 25 | I would suggest that let's take a break and | 25 | MR. GITTENS: |

## Q. We understand that to be ruling on your behalf, Madam Commissioner?

CHAIR:
Q. I'm just saying that any further examination of the issue of independence of our consultant will have to be done by way of formal motion with supporting evidence and documentation please.
MR. GITTENS:
Q. So, you are ruling that if we want to make any further issues on the independence that we make a formal application, do I understand that to be your -
CHAIR:
Q. Yes.

MR. GITTENS:
Q. Thank you. I'm wondering if we may have five minutes please because we have to decide what we are going to do about that ruling.
CHAIR:
Q. Are you going to continue with your questioning? We only have -
MR. GITTENS:
Q. Yes, we'd like to continue with the

Page 74
questioning, but we are asking for five $\quad 1$ minutes break so I can consult with a number of the other counsel to decide what we want to do about the ruling you have just made.
STAMP, Q.C.:
Q. We're going to break, Madam Chair if I might say, in an hour and a half anyway, I think the questioning should continue on the merits of the matters and let the discussion that my friend wants to have occur at 12:00.
CHAIR:
Q. I agree. There will be sufficient time. Do you have further questions on other areas for Ms. Elliott?
MR. GITTENS:
Q. Yes, we do.

CHAIR:
Q. Okay, well, could you continue with the questioning and then you can take up your discussions with other parties after.
MR. GITTENS:
Q. Very well, thank you.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ms. Elliott, let's turn to page 7 of your report on
profitability of insures in Newfoundland, under operating expenses. And I just want to be clear that-and I read in the first sentence, "we use the average industry operating expenses cost as reported by IBC and GISA". Yes?
MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. That's correct.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Alright. And so you've done no independent review of the operating expenses that have been supplied by the IBC to GISA, is that correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. That's correct.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Yes. And it's your understanding that when IBC submits that data to GISA, GISA accepts the data. It doesn't so any kind of independent review of the operating expenses either, does it?
(10:30 a.m.)
MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. The expense information that is provided to IBC would be for each province, the
information is submitted and those expenses reconciled tot the financial statement reports that are audited by an independent auditor for each company. So, there is that, if you will, check and balance to the total amounts that they would all sum and aggregate and be correct. And that then each are allocated to each province.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right. So, but I guess my question wasn't clear, let me be clear. GISA doesn't do any type of independent review as to the appropriateness of the operating expenses, is that correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. No, it's my understanding that GISA uses IBC as its service provider to do a check and validation of all the data that is collected and compiled by them.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Okay. So, I'm not sure I understand what that means. Does GISA go out and actually inspect the company's books that have provided the data to the IBC to make sure that the operating expenses are appropriate?

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MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. Well, there is a reconciliation of the data
        that is submitted by the individual
        companies that it reconciles. So, they
        would submit information for each province,
        so for automobile insurance and that
        information is then reconciled and signed
        off by their auditor that it is accurate and
        correct.
    MASON, Q.C.:
    Q. But that's the company's auditor that does
        that, correct, not GISA's auditor?
    MS. ELLIOTT:
    Q. Well, no, that would be the independent, say
        Ernst and Young or PWC or whoever they hire.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right. So, it's a fairly simple question
        because I think the answer is pretty clear,
        that GISA does not do their own independent
        audit of the operating expenses. It relies
        on the data provided by the company,
        provided to the IBC which may be audited
        independently by some other company, but
        GISA itself doesn't do any type of
        independent audit of that data, correct?
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## Page 78

MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. GISA doesn't-GISA is the general insurance statistical agency and they contract through to IBC to manage the collection of the validation of data.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right. And again, the IBC is the lobby group for the insurers who is receiving this data from the insurers, correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. That is one arm of IBC, yes, that's correct. MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Okay. So, if we look at the operating expenses at page seven of your report, we see from 2007 to 2012, operating expenses are an expense ratio. And the expense ratio is a percentage, some kind of derivation of a percentage of the premium, correct?
MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. Yes, it's those aggregate costs divided by premium.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. And we see 29.7 percent in ' 07 up to 2012, 28.1 percent. And I added those up and average it and it worked out to an average
14
of 29.2 percent for operating expenses through that timeframe.
MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. Um-hm.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. My math may be off a little bit, I'm not an actuary, but it looks essentially correct, yes?
MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. Yes, sure, yeah.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. And I ended up between 2013 and 2016 because the expense ratio dropped and I understand why it dropped--2e'll talk about that in a second-but it dropped on average to 24.4 percent over that timeframe.
MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. Um-hm.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. So, a difference of about 4.8 almost 5 percent, the expense ratio from 2007 to 2012 versus 2013 to 2016. And I believe in your report you say that the expense ratio dropped because of the way the insurance companies-I don't know if it's GISA or the
insurance companies or the IBC started reporting that data. They did it-rather than net expense, net premium, they went to direct expense, direct premium, is that right?
MS. ELLIOTT:
Q. Right. There was a change from a voluntary
reporting of expense information, a survey
approach to a required mandatory reporting.
MASON, Q.C.:
11 Q. Right.

|  | Page 81 |  | Page 83 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | highest auto insurance premiums in the | 1 | but include commercial automobiles as well. |
| 2 | country. | 2 | As such, due to the more complex nature of |
| 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 3 | some commercial automobile risks, the IBC |
| 4 | Q. Well, not in the country, but maybe in the | 4 | total expense ratios may be slightly |
| 5 | Atlantic area. | 5 | overstated for private passenger |
| 6 | MASON, Q.C.: | 6 | automobiles". Do you see that? |
| 7 | Q. Okay. So, I don't know if that's an empty | 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 8 | sound bite on his part or not, but let's say | 8 | Q. Um-hm. |
| 9 | he's right. Let's say that the highest | 9 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 10 | premiums, auto insurance premiums are paid | 10 | Q. And if we look - |
| 11 | in Newfoundland. Would you agree with me | 11 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 12 | that if a province has the highest premium | 12 | Q. Just for clarification, that's for the first |
| 13 | where the expense ratio is based on a | 13 | five years. |
| 14 | percentage of the premium, that in terms of | 14 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 15 | operating expenses, you would expect the | 15 | Q. Oh, is it the first-that's not-that doesn't |
| 16 | expense ratio to be lower in areas where the | 16 | continue to this day? |
| 17 | premium is higher? | 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 18 | Q. No. |
| 19 | Q. Yes, that's | 19 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 20 | MASON, Q.C.: | 20 | Q. Okay, all right. Because I didn't see an |
| 21 | Q. Makes sens | 21 | adjustment for that in your figures when you |
| 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 22 | were calculating what was an appropriate-or |
| 23 | Q. But I will—we should clarify that Ontario | 23 | what was the return on equity of 2016 in |
| 24 | does have higher premiums than Newfoundland, | 24 | Newfoundland. |
| 25 | is not the highest. | 25 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
|  | Page 82 |  | Page 84 |
| 1 | MASON, Q.C.: | 1 | A. Oh, the top of the next paragraph - |
| 2 | Q. Okay, alright, well thank you for that. | 2 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 3 | Thank you for that as well about the | 3 | Q. Right. |
| 4 | premium. So, if the premium is higher, the | 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 5 | expense ratio should be a little bit lower | 5 | A. - we reference that it's specific to private |
| 6 | because if we had, for example, if | 6 | passenger. |
| 7 | Newfoundland, I'm paying \$1,000.00 premium | 7 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 8 | and there's a 30 percent operating expense, | 8 | Q. All right, okay, that's fair. Thank you. |
| 9 | $\$ 300.00$ goes towards operating expenses. If | 9 | Now, Mr. Zubulake testified in Alberta in |
| 10 | I'm in Nova Scotia and I pay $\$ 500.00$ and we | 10 | 2005 at their rate review hearing. Were you |
| 11 | have the same operating expense at 30 | 11 | a part of that process in Alberta in 2005? |
| 12 | percent, they only get $\$ 150.00$, right. So, | 12 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 13 | you would expect in Newfoundland that the | 13 | A. I might have been in attendance at the |
| 14 | percentage would be a little lower, right. | 14 | meeting. I did not testify, and I would |
| 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 15 | have been-participated in the writing of the |
| 16 | Q. Right, um-hm. | 16 | report. |
| 17 | MASON, Q.C.: | 17 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 18 | Q. Okay, thank you. Now, in your report at | 18 | Q. Right. And I guess in terms of expense |
| 19 | page 7 you say under "discussion", you say, | 19 | ratios and operating expenses, you would |
| 20 | "while the commission expense ratio is | 20 | anticipate that the expense ratio would be |
| 21 | specific for private passenger automobile | 21 | higher all things being equal, will be |
| 22 | and the premium tax rate is the same rate | 22 | higher in provinces where the cost of living |
| 23 | for all automobile risks, the reported costs | 23 | is a little higher than where it's lower. |
| 24 | under the other expense category are not | 24 | Yes? |
| 25 | specific to private passenger automobiles, | 25 | MS. ELLIOTT: |



|  | Page 89 |  | Page 91 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Board, if we look at page 20 of this | 1 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 2 | decision, and I'm happy if you want to | 2 | Q. So, is that the reason you did not advise |
| 3 | review this, but page 20 of the decision, | 3 | this Board when you were looking at these |
| 4 | the bottom paragraph says, "The Board finds | 4 | expense ratios from 2007 to 2012 that it was |
| 5 | that Mercer's selection of a 23 percent | 5 | much higher than the data that you looked at |
| 6 | expense provision to be reasonable." | 6 | in a province where the cost of living is |
| 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 7 | much higher or is higher at 23 percent? |
| 8 | A. Um-hm. | 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 9 | MASON, Q.C.: | 9 | A. Um-hm. |
| 10 | Q. "And encourages the IBC the industry | 10 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 11 | statistical agent be in a position to | 11 | Q. Is that the reason why you didn't advise the |
| 12 | provide the Board and its actuary with more | 12 | Board of that difference? |
| 13 | timely and complete expense information in | 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 14 | the future." So, we know that in Alberta, | 14 | A. No, we're reporting on a presenting what the |
| 15 | the-Mr. Zubulake and the Board, where the | 15 | operating expense ratios were in hindsight, |
| 16 | cost of living is likely higher, concluded | 16 | reported by the companies presenting that. |
| 17 | that a 23 percent expense ratio is | 17 | This is the information that's reported by |
| 18 | appropriate. Now if we compare that to the | 18 | GISA. And as we discussed earlier, for the |
| 19 | chart we looked at in your report at page 7, | 19 | years 2012 and prior, it was under a |
| 20 | the average was 29.2 percent and we're | 20 | different reporting structure where it was |
| 21 | comparing apples and apples, because they | 21 | voluntary. Not all companies were |
| 22 | were both under the regime at that time. | 22 | reporting, and then there was a change as |
| 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 23 | well to be mandatory and a different basis |
| 24 | A. Um-hm, u | 24 | in the calculation. So, it wasn't my view |
| 25 | MASON, Q.C.: | 25 | that the information reported was flawed by |
|  | Page 90 |  | Page 92 |
| 1 | Q. Net expenses that made for the-and direct | 1 | what was reported to the companies and then |
| 2 | expense made a difference in 2012, but we've | 2 | compiled and reported by IBC through the |
| 3 | got an average of 29.2 percent during that | 3 | GISA, that it was incorrect or flawed. |
| 4 | timeframe for 2007 to 2012 in Newfoundland, | 4 | There was a change, but it wasn't my |
| 5 | yet we have Mercer, Mr. Zubulake, your | 5 | understanding that it was incorrect. |
| 6 | company, saying that 23 percent is the | 6 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 7 | appropriate expense ratio? | 7 | Q. Right, because that's a pretty big |
| 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 8 | difference in terms of the - |
| 9 | A. Um-hm. Well, that, you know, clearly is the | 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 10 | statement that was made, but in terms of | 10 | A. Well, we - |
| 11 | Newfoundland, you know, another component is | 11 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 12 | with a larger volume of premium, there are a | 12 | Q. Let me finish this, my question. |
| 13 | larger base to spread the costs over. So, | 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 14 | some of the differences that occur between | 14 | A. Um-hm. |
| 15 | the provinces is due to the volume of | 15 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 16 | premium over the fixed expense of the | 16 | Q. For an expense ratio to be 23 percent at one |
| 17 | salaries that are paid for the staff, the | 17 | province and 29.2 percent in the Province of |
| 18 | rent that they're paying, is the volume of | 18 | Newfoundland, it's a big difference. |
| 19 | premium that they are working with. There | 19 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 20 | are fewer vehicles in Newfoundland than | 20 | A. Well, it doesn't make the percentages of the |
| 21 | there would be in the Alberta. In Alberta | 21 | expense ratio incorrect. It just makes them |
| 22 | they have a larger volume of premium that | 22 | different. |
| 23 | they're underwriting and handling, and that | 23 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 24 | may contribute to a lower expense ratio as | 24 | Q. Right, but does it make it reasonable I |
| 25 | well. | 25 | guess is the question. |

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. No, it's not so much-we're not measuring-our report here is a hindsight look at the profit based on the reported data.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. You may suggest that you find it high, but it is the amount that was reported, and we believe it to be correct. The issue of whether the expense ratio that's currently in the, sort of 25 percent range, whether that's reasonable or not, and are there alternatives suggested as to how to lower that expense ratio?
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Yes.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. That's a different discussion.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. We're just presenting and reporting what it was.
MASON, Q.C.:
Page 94
Q. Yes. I just would have thought because you presented across the country in different jurisdictions, so that we have an independent and thorough investigation, that you might raise with this Board and the parties here that, look, in other jurisdictions, the expense ratios are much lower than they are here, but you didn't feel that that was within your mandate or not necessary to do, is that right?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, I think there are components that cause the expense ratios to be different in different provinces. And certainly, the premium tax rate is one; the percentage of companies that operating in the province as either direct writers with lower commission acquisition costs versus broker-based companies, that can make a difference. So, and then, after that we're left with the cost of salaries and rent in the province.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right, got you.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. So, we're not-this is a hindsight review of

|  |  | Page 94 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | Q. | Yes. I just would have thought because you |
| 2 |  | presented across the country in different |
| 3 |  | jurisdictions, so that we have an |
| 4 |  | independent and thorough investigation, that |
| 5 |  | you might raise with this Board and the |
| 6 |  | parties here that, look, in other |
| 7 |  | jurisdictions, the expense ratios are much |
| 8 |  | lower than they are here, but you didn't |
| 9 |  | feel that that was within your mandate or |
| 10 | not necessary to do, is that right? |  |
| 11 | MS. ELLIOTT: |  |
| 12 | A. | Well, I think there are components that |
| 13 |  | cause the expense ratios to be different in |
| 14 |  | different provinces. And certainly, the |
| 15 |  | premium tax rate is one; the percentage of |
| 16 | companies that operating in the province as |  |
| 17 | either direct writers with lower commission |  |
| 18 | acquisition costs versus broker-based |  |
| 19 | companies, that can make a difference. So, |  |
| 20 | and then, after that we're left with the |  |
| 21 | cost of salaries and rent in the province. |  |
| 22 | MASON, Q.C.: |  |
| 23 | Q. | Right, got you. |
| 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: |  |
| 25 | A. | So, we're not-this is a hindsight review of |

Q. Yeah. So, it's not fair to compare a 23
percent return in Alberta in 2005 to an expense ratio in Newfoundland where the criteria of how it's measured have changed.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, I think that -- you're suggesting the comparison to Alberta. We could make comparisons to Ontario, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick as well. But, their expense ratios in those provinces, each of the provinces, the data all adds up together to make the total, which has been reconciled and data that is reviewed and signed off by an independent auditor. The fact that the costs are lower for this particular year that you're referring to, although I know it's higher now in Alberta than 23 percent, the fact that there is a difference is just a fact that there is a difference. It doesn't make the data that was reported at the time for those years wrong. It's just what they were. We're reporting on what it was and it has lowered since 2007. It's a lower expense ratio. So, albeit the number that was used in a prior report going back

Page 98
1

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. I'm not going to badger you on this. I just want to make sure I've got it right though because the difference between Alberta and Newfoundland, when we're looking at 2005, the 23 percent expense ratio, and the figures between 2007 and 2012, before - in
Newfoundland before they started reporting them differently, the expense ratio comprised of the premium tax rate, which is you said is around four percent in Newfoundland and maybe a little lower than that in Alberta. That's not the major component of a 29.4 percent expense ratio, of course. The broker fees are the same. They're 12 and a half percent. So, we're down to operating expenses as being the driver that makes a difference between Alberta and Newfoundland.
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes.

## MASON, Q.C.:

Q. Right. Would you agree with me on it?

## MS. ELLIOTT:

A. And there's also a component for brokers for their contingent commission, which can be an additional two to three percentage points.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. All right. But even if you add that two to three percent in, the different really is the operating expenses in Newfoundland versus the operating expenses in Alberta?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Right, and the smaller volume of business in the province may contribute to some extent to the higher.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Maybe. But that may be offset as well by the fact that the cost of living in Alberta is higher than it is in Newfoundland, correct?

## MS. ELLIOTT:

A. Well, it's really a matter of the salaries that are paid to the people in Newfoundland versus Alberta.
MASON, Q.C.:
Page 100
Q. Right.

MS. ELLIOTT:
A. I'm not sure about those differences amongst the provinces.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. So, this Board, looking at this particular issue, they say "well, gosh, you know what, why do we not have operating expenses at 23 percent?" Make a ruling like they did in Alberta and say 23 percent was appropriate. How do they find out - how do they examine the reasonableness of those operating expenses if not through you?
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Well, in terms of this report, this is a presentation of what the aggregated expenses are for private passenger for this review, albeit there was a merger or mixture with some commercial information, commercial auto for the older years due to the reporting structure. Individual companies, when they submit their rate application for the rates that they charge in this province, they need to provide support for their expense ratios and


|  | Page 105 |  | Page 107being the same; claims costs being the same, |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | you didn't use the 25 percent rate that was | 1 |  |  |
| 2 | recommended - or not recommended, but | 2 |  | premium being the same and so on? Are you |
| 3 | ordered by this Board in 2005, and I didn't | 3 |  | able to calculate that figure for me? |
| 4 | see any reference in your report, in your | 4 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 5 | analysis, of different rates that could have | 5 | A. | Yes, not at - not right here, sitting here, |
| 6 | been imposed or used. I'm wondering why | 6 |  | but yes. |
| 7 | that is. | 7 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 8 | Q | All right. I know in some other utility |
| 9 | A. We were presenting in this discussion the | 9 |  | review board hearings, I've asked the |
| 10 | report, this part one, our understanding of | 10 |  | witness as an undertaking to do that |
| 11 | what the actual expense costs were. So, | 11 |  | calculation for me and they've agreed to do |
| 12 | albeit it could have been higher or lower | 12 |  | that. Is that something you're prepared to |
| 13 | than 25 percent, we were reporting what was | 13 |  | do; to calculate what it would be in terms |
| 14 | provided to GISA and through IBC and | 14 |  | of the return equity, if we use the exact |
| 15 | published. | 15 |  | same premium and claims costs and so on, |
| 16 | MASON, Q.C.: | 16 |  | what it would be in terms of a return on |
| 17 | Q. Sure. So, let me just take you through | 17 |  | equity at 23 percent versus the 29.7 percent |
| 18 | this. So, if the average back in the 2005- | 18 |  | or 29.2 percent that I quoted in this |
| 19 | 2006 range, if the average - if it was a 23 | 19 |  | figure? |
| 20 | percent expense ratio or a 25 percent | 20 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 21 | expense ratio versus the 29.2 percent | 21 | A. | I'm prepared to complete any undertaking |
| 22 | expense ratio that we see from 2007 to 2012 | 22 |  | that the Board would request me to do. |
| 23 | in Newfoundland and Labrador, according to | 23 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 24 | your chart, you would agree with me that if | 24 | Q | And it would be helpful, I think, as well, |
| 25 | all of the factors were kept the same that | 25 |  | I'll put one more out there, is if you run |
|  | Page 106 |  |  | Page 108 |
| 1 | if we use a lower operating expense ratio or | 1 |  | it at 23 percent and also 25 percent that |
| 2 | expense ratio, it's going to drive the | 2 |  | this Board had recommended in 2005 as an |
| 3 | return on equity up, correct? | 3 |  | appropriate expense ratio. |
| 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 4 |  |  |
| 5 | A. Yes, if the expense ratio - if you were to | 5 | Q. | Mr. Mason, could I just suggest though, just |
| 6 | assume that it was lower than it actually | 6 |  | to be clear for the record, could you |
| 7 | was, as provided, then there would be an | 7 |  | actually put that undertaking in writing |
| 8 | increase in the return on equity, yes. | 8 |  | following today? |
| 9 | MASON, Q.C.: | 9 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 10 | Q. Right. So, if we say that - if we say that | 10 | Q. | I'm happy to do that, Madam Chair, sure. |
| 11 | the appropriate expense ratio is 23 percent | 11 |  |  |
| 12 | when we look at Alberta, if the Board said | 12 | Q. | That would be a bit easier, make sure we all |
| 13 | that, and you - and kind of transported that | 13 |  | understand what's being asked and what Ms. |
| 14 | into today's world at 2016-2017, and we know | 14 |  | Elliot is being requested to answer. |
| 15 | that there's a different way that it's | 15 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 16 | reported, and the difference constitutes a | 16 | Q. | And the reason that I'm asking that |
| 17 | change of about 4.8 percent between before | 17 |  | question, just so everybody is clear on it, |
| 18 | the change was made and after the change was | 18 |  | if the expense ratio is lower and we keep |
| 19 | made. So, if we say 23 percent is the | 19 |  | all the other factors the same, the return |
| 20 | expense ratio and we take 4.8 percent off of | 20 |  | on equity is going to improve for the |
| 21 | that, what is that, 18 - anyway, whatever | 21 |  | insurers, right? |
| 22 | the number is. If we use that as the | 22 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 23 | expense ratio, are you able to calculate for | 23 | A. | Yes. So, you're asking to - in how I would |
| 24 | me what the return on equity would be in | 24 |  | view it is test an assumption. If it was |
| 25 | Newfoundland based on all the other factors | 25 |  | this, what would it have been? |


|  | Page 109 |  | Page 111 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | MASON, Q.C.: | 1 | ultimately cost to close and settle that |
| 2 | Q. Correct. | 2 | file. So, those amounts are reported and |
| 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 3 | that's the data that we received and then we |
| 4 | A. But in fact, it wasn't, but we can test | 4 | use that aggregated data of all the |
| 5 | that. | 5 | insurance companies together, the amounts |
| 6 | MASON, Q.C.: | 6 | paid and the amounts by each - the case |
| 7 | Q. All right. One of the other significant | 7 | adjuster that does the file, and we look at |
| 8 | factors in determining rate adequacy are | 8 | that aggregated data and we make estimates, |
| 9 | claims costs, yes? | 9 | is that an aggregate sufficient or |
| 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 10 | insufficient for when all the claims are |
| 11 | A. Um-hm. | 11 | closed and settled for a particular accident |
| 12 | MASON, Q.C.: | 12 | year. And we would adjust that amount, |
| 13 | Q. Sorry, you're nodding your head yes? | 13 | those totals paid in the case reserve for |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 | any change in that amount for when the claim |
| 15 | A. Yes, yes, yes, sorry. | 15 | is filed, closed and settled. We refer to |
| 16 | MASON, Q.C.: | 16 | that as an IBNR, the actual reserve. So, |
| 17 | Q. Thank you. And the ultimate loss and | 17 | we're looking at that, Oliver Wyman, and |
| 18 | allocated adjusting expenses, that's | 18 | estimating that. |
| 19 | comprised of claims payouts and reserves? | 19 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 20 | Is that correct? | 20 | Q. So, what you're looking at when you're |
| 21 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 21 | preparing your charts is you're looking at |
| 22 | A. Yes, for older years, the claims get closer | 22 | the case reserve that's being provided by |
| 23 | to being completely settled and paid and | 23 | the adjuster on the file? |
| 24 | closed, the files close. In more recent | 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 25 | years, there are more estimates, referred to | 25 | A. Um-hm. |
|  | Page 110 |  | Page 112 |
| 1 | as reserve. | 1 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 2 | MASON, Q.C.: | 2 | Q. And - but, you're not looking at the |
| 3 | Q. Right. And the data that's provided by auto | 3 | supplemental reserve that's being put on the |
| 4 | insurers in this province that goes to the | 4 | aggregate data by the IBC before it goes to |
| 5 | IBC, and then in turn is sent by the IBC to | 5 | GISA? |
| 6 | GISA, is the data that you're relying upon | 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 7 | in determining the loss ratios - or sorry, | 7 | A. There's no aggregated supplemental reserve |
| 8 | not the loss ratios, but the return on | 8 | that goes to GISA. |
| 9 | equity in your calculations here? Is that | 9 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 10 | correct? | 10 | Q. Is that the way it's always been? |
| 11 | (11:00 a.m.) | 11 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 12 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 12 | A. Yes. The companies report for each |
| 13 | A. Well, what we use is the paid amounts that | 13 | individual claim file the amount paid on |
| 14 | are reported, of course. | 14 | that file and the case reserve as set by the |
| 15 | MASON, Q.C.: | 15 | adjuster on that file. |
| 16 | Q. Right. | 16 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 17 | Q. All right. I'm going to take you through |
| 18 | A. All this is reported. The amounts that are | 18 | the constitutional challenge, part of the |
| 19 | set for each individual file, referred to as | 19 | transcript between - a cross-examination |
| 20 | a case reserve. | 20 | between myself and Mr. Zubulake. I'm |
| 21 | MASON, Q.C.: | 21 | looking at page 10-010. |
| 22 | Q. Right. | 22 | MS. GLYNN: |
| 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 23 | Q. Exhibit 5, Mr. Mason, the discussion |
| 24 | A. So, each individual file would have a | 24 | document? |
| 25 | different estimate of what it will | 25 | MASON, Q.C.: |



|  | Page 117 |  | Page 119 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | MASON, Q.C.: | 1 | closed and settled, that is the data that |
| 2 | Q. But again, in terms of Newfoundland and | 2 | goes to IBC. |
| 3 | claims reserves or supplemental claims | 3 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 4 | reserves, we've only seen increases in the | 4 | Q. Right. |
| 5 | supplemental claims reserves over the past | 5 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 6 | five years, not decreases with respect to | 6 | A. Then that aggregated data is looked at by |
| 7 | bodily injury claims? Is that right? | 7 | IBC's actuary - |
| 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 8 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 9 | A. That would be typical, right. Typically, it | 9 | Q. Right. |
| 10 | would be an add-on for years, five years or | 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 11 | less. | 11 | A. - independently, to evaluate what they think |
| 12 | MASON, Q.C.: | 12 | will ultimately be the total amount when all |
| 13 | Q. All right. And if we carry on, he says "and | 13 | claims are settled and closed for that |
| 14 | now to get to your question, what the | 14 | accident year. IBC's actuary does that |
| 15 | companies report to IBC as their claim | 15 | independently. Oliver Wyman, myself, we |
| 16 | reserve, the case reserve estimates they do | 16 | also do that independently. So, we look at |
| 17 | not report to IBC. They're supplemental | 17 | the amounts that have been paid. We look at |
| 18 | actuarial reserves. It's the actuarial | 18 | the case reserve that's set on that |
| 19 | reserve estimate, that supplemental reserve | 19 | individual file. We take that information |
| 20 | with IBC, is what IBC's actuary estimates." | 20 | and then we, Oliver Wyman, create this |
| 21 | Right? | 21 | additional actuarial reserve, supplemental |
| 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 22 | reserve. |
| 23 | A. Right. So, IBC makes their estimate. | 23 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 24 | MASON, Q.C.: | 24 | Q. Okay. |
| 25 | Q. Right. | 25 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
|  | Page 118 |  | Page 120 |
| 1 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 1 | A. Separately from IBC. |
| 2 | A. And Oliver Wyman, we make our estimate. | 2 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 3 | MASON, Q.C.: | 3 | Q. But if we read what Mr. Zubulake - |
| 4 | Q. I got you on that, okay. I'm just trying to | 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 5 | get the flow of the data here because what | 5 | A. I know what - I know what he said. |
| 6 | happens is the case reserve is put on by the | 6 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 7 | adjuster at the claims level. | 7 | Q. Okay, but - |
| 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 8 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 9 | A. Um-hm. | 9 | A. And I'm telling you what he - this is what |
| 10 | MASON, Q.C.: | 10 | he was trying to express to you. Things |
| 11 | Q. The IBC puts a supplemental reserve on the | 11 | have not changed since then. That is how it |
| 12 | figures that comes before it that typically | 12 | works. |
| 13 | is always higher on bodily injury claims and | 13 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 14 | that data goes off to GISA, right? | 14 | Q. Okay, thank you. He says "I've got you". |
| 15 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 15 | As we carry on in this conversation or |
| 16 | A. No, no. No, you have that wrong. | 16 | discussion I'm having with him, "I think |
| 17 | MASON, Q.C.: | 17 | I've got it. Okay", he says. 'So, we've |
| 18 | Q. All right. | 18 | got the claim reserve that's set by an |
| 19 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 19 | adjuster that historically is too low? |
| 20 | A. The data that goes to GISA is the amount | 20 | Yeah. And then you've got the - is it the |
| 21 | that is paid on that individual claim file, | 21 | IBC's actuary that puts in the supplemental |
| 22 | paid for lost wages or whatever the item is, | 22 | reserve? Only for the purposes of the |
| 23 | the amounts paid. The case - the adjuster | 23 | reporting, the numbers that are reported to |
| 24 | that's working on that file, their estimate | 24 | GISA." |
| 25 | of what it will be when it ultimately all | 25 | MS. ELLIOTT: |



|  | Page 125 |  | $\text { Page } 127$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | MASON, Q.C.: | 1 | encompassing terminology, but when rates are |
| 2 | Q. Yeah, the same - well, five pages in. | 2 | set, if in hindsight the losses are less |
| 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 3 | than anticipated - |
| 4 | A. Um-hm. | 4 | ASON, Q.C.: |
| 5 | MASON, Q.C.: | 5 | Q. Right. |
| 6 | Q. And I thought when I was reviewing that that | 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 7 | the retrospective was the GISA data and the | 7 | A. When those premiums were set, then there |
| 8 | prospective was your analysis. | 8 | will be more allowed, if you will, that will |
| 9 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 9 | flow into profit, and if they are higher |
| 10 | A. No, no, the first Appendix A is in reference | 10 | than estimated when those premiums were set, |
| 11 | to our Part 2 of the report where we look at | 11 | then they will be less. |
| 12 | the most recent five years, 2012 to 2016, to | 12 | SON, Q.C.: |
| 13 | look at what our estimate, Oliver Wyman's | 13 | Q. Got you, and in Nova Scotia, we know, and we |
| 14 | estimate, of the required premium by | 14 | can go through this documentation, we know |
| 15 | coverage compared to what the premiums | 15 | that the estimates for the supplemental |
| 16 | charged actually were, and then in Appendix | 16 | reserve and the case reserves were too high |
| 17 | B, Part 3, we are trying to forecast what | 17 | in 2002, 2001 and 2002, when Mr. Zubulake |
| 18 | 2017 would be, but again it's Oliver Wyman's | 18 | was testifying before the Utility Review |
| 19 | estimate of the reserves. | 19 | Board, correct? |
| 20 | MASON, Q.C.: | 20 | ELLIOTT: |
| 21 | Q. Got you. I think I follow you, okay. So | 21 | A. Yes, the premiums that were set were based |
| 22 | you would agree with me that as claims cost | 22 | on an estimate of losses that in hindsight |
| 23 | and reserves go up, if we hold the other | 23 | showed to be too high. The ultimate loss |
| 24 | factors, equal premiums and operating | 24 | ratios were less than initially anticipated. |
| 25 | expenses, as they go up the return on equity | 25 | (11:15 a.m.) |
|  | Page 126 |  | Page 128 |
| 1 | is going to go down, correct? | 1 | MASON, Q.C.: |
| 2 | ELLIOTT: | 2 | Q. And you'll remember, Ms. Elliott, back in |
| 3 | A. Yes, there's a - if it's underestimated what | 3 | 2001/2002 at the Nova Scotia Utility Review |
| 4 | the losses will be and then in hindsight | 4 | Board, that it was - I believe the trial |
| 5 | looking back if the losses are more than | 5 | lawyers, a coalition for injured workers, |
| 6 | were expected for what the premium was | 6 | had made the argument that the premiums - |
| 7 | charged, then it would be lower than what | 7 | sorry, not the premiums, the claims cost, |
| 8 | the profit provision included in those rates | 8 | sorry, reserves were too high at that time |
| 9 | when they were set. | 9 | and the Board did not accept that evidence? |
| 10 | MASON, Q.C.: | 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: |
| 11 | Q. Thank you for that, and the opposite is | 11 | A. Yeah, and so I think it's - I do recall |
| 12 | true, that if the claims cost - well, not so | 12 | that, yes, and the issue is that the |
| 13 | much the claims cost because they've been | 13 | premiums that are set today if a rate filing |
| 14 | paid out, but if the reserves, the | 14 | comes in in 2018, that may apply to premiums |
| 15 | supplemental reserve of the case reserve, is | 15 | that are being sold in 2019 into 2000, with |
| 16 | too high as history may show, we keep the | 16 | the lapse, you know, of implementation time, |
| 17 | other factors steady, premiums and operating | 17 | and today the - only about a week ago, the |
| 18 | expenses, then what's going to happen those | 18 | full year, 2017, data is available. So |
| 19 | claims costs are going to come down and the | 19 | often they are using data from 2016. There |
| 20 | return on equity is going to be better, | 20 | could be a year, a year and a half gap with |
| 21 | correct? | 21 | the data. So there's quite a large window |
| 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 22 | of time looking forward for rate setting |
| 23 | A. So the claims cost terminology, just to be | 23 | using data that's older, so as a result the |
| 24 | clear, it includes all amounts, whether | 24 | estimates sometimes are close and other |
| 25 | they're paid or reserved. It's an all | 25 | times they're too high, and other times too |




|  | Page 137 | Page 139 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | what are the claims payouts as we move | 1 | MASON, Q.C.: |  |
| 2 | forward, is that correct? | 2 | Q. Right, and that's how we arrive at a 7 |  |
| 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 3 |  | percent increase in claim severity? |
| 4 | A. Yes. | 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: |  |
| 5 | MASON, Q.C.: | 5 | A. | Yes, and we do look at excluding the most |
| 6 | Q. All right, and as I understood your evidence | 6 |  | recent year because that data can be more |
| 7 | I heard yesterday, you've estimated that | 7 |  | volatile and subject to change as the |
| 8 | claims payouts or claim severity, sorry, | 8 |  | reserves may change for the more recent |
| 9 | claim severity, is going to increase or has | 9 |  | years. |
| 10 | increased at 7 percent per year and it's | 10 | SON, Q.C.: |  |
| 11 | going to continue to increase at 7 percent | 11 | Q. Right. |  |
| 12 | per year? | 12 | MS. ELLIOTT: |  |
| 13 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 13 | A. | So we test it in many different ways. We |
| 14 | A. Well, our measurement is looking to the | 14 |  | also test, you know, looking at over a |
| 15 | past, what has occurred, and barring any | 15 |  | period of time how it- so many, many |
| 16 | changes, we would expect that the past would | 16 |  | different ways in coming up with our 7 |
| 17 | predict the future, so, yes. | 17 |  | percent estimate. |
| 18 | MASON, Q.C.: | 18 | MASON, Q.C.: |  |
| 19 | Q. So how long have claims severity been | 19 |  | So when you're looking at the 7 percent |
| 20 | increasing in this province at the rate of 7 | 20 |  | increase in claim severity, you exclude |
| 21 | percent per year? | 21 |  | 2016, is that right? |
| 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 22 | MS. ELLIOTT: |  |
| 23 | A. Well, that's an average number, and the | 23 | A. We will test with and without that year, |  |
| 24 | timeline is likely over a period since 2004, | 24 | yes. |  |
| 25 | so I don't - | 25 |  | MASON, Q.C.: |
|  | Page 138 |  |  | Page 140 |
| 1 | MASON, Q.C.: | 1 | Q. | Did you exclude 2016 when you did your calculations for rate adequacy in this |
| 2 | Q. Since 2000. | 2 |  |  |
| 3 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 3 |  | province, did you exclude the claims |
| 4 | A. The timeline would be at least over the last | 4 |  | reserves and claims payouts for that |
| 5 | five years. I'd have to open our - I'd have | 5 |  | particular year? |
| 6 | to refresh the basis for the 7 percent, but | 6 | MS. ELLIOTT: |  |
| 7 | it would be a number of years. | 7 | A. | Well, we did look at - yes, effectively, we did because we looked at the data. In |
| 8 | MASON, Q.C.: | 8 |  |  |
| 9 | Q. Okay. | 9 |  | Appendix B, we looked at the data using the |
| 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 10 |  | fiscal year ending June 30th, 2017, and then |
| 11 | A. There would be some years that it would be | 11 |  | in Appendix B, sheet 2 of 3, June, 2015, |
| 12 | higher, lower, but it's been increasing. | 12 |  | ending June, 2016, and ending June, 2017, so |
| 13 | MASON, Q.C.: | 13 |  | we did go back in time and see what those |
| 14 | Q. And part of that 7 percent that you're | 14 |  | results were for forecasting 2017, so |
| 15 | looking at is the claims reserve that's | 15 |  | excluding the most recent data, the answer |
| 16 | going up? | 16 |  | is yes, yeah. |
| 17 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 17 | MASON, Q.C.: |  |
| 18 | A. Uh-hm. | 18 |  | So a 7 percent increase in claim severity |
| 19 | MASON, Q.C.: | 19 | over the past several years? |  |
| 20 | Q. And the supplemental reserve that's being | 20 | MS. ELLIOTT: |  |
| 21 | put onto the file, is that correct, or put | 21 | A. Uh-hm. |  |
| 22 | onto the aggregate data? | 22 | MASON, Q.C.: |  |
| 23 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 23 | Q. | And one thing I didn't see in here was the actual dollar amount. I saw cost per car, but I didn't see dollar amount. Why didn't |
| 24 | A. It would be what we applied to the data, | 24 |  |  |
| 25 | yes, our estimate of what is - | 25 |  |  |


Q. Got you, okay, frequency is also a factor. 1 MS. ELLIOTT:
A. Yes, and it's declining, yes.

MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Okay. Now, the claims payouts by an insurance adjuster that makes up, we're coming up with a case reserve and all that, that's based on precedent, based on court awards, correct?
(11:30 a.m.)
MS. ELLIOTT:
A. That would be my understanding that they are aware of amounts paid in other similar cases, yeah.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. Right, so they're not paying somebody because they like their good looks, they pay them because they say, look, this is what the courts have awarded for pain and suffering damages and therefore, this is what we're going to offer you for your claim?

## MS. ELLIOTT:

A. The bodily injury claim adjusters are the more senior staff, right, they would be

Page 146
aware of court cases and what's being paid in prior settlements, either inside their company or outside their company.
MASON, Q.C.:
Q. I guess what I find interesting or difficult to comprehend is we know that the reserving practices are highly volatile because we saw what happened in Nova Scotia where insurers were over reserved indicated that there was a very low return on equity; in fact, a negative return on equity, that turned out to be a 10.8 percent return on equity in 2002 because of the changes with reserves. Is why, either you or you haven't made a recommendation to this Board, there isn't some type of analysis indicating that court awards have gone up in this province by 7 percent each year. Do you have any statistical evidence that would show that?

## MS. ELLIOTT:

A. Well there are very few claim files that actually go to court in our Closed Claims Study where we had 1471 claimant files, there were, no event did it indicate that any of those claimants actually went to

|  | $\text { Page } 149$ | Page 151 |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | expenses and cost per car, do you see that? | 1 | MASON, Q.C.: |  |
| 2 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 2 | Q. | If we look at the subsequent years, we see |
| 3 | A. Uh-hm. | 3 |  | approximately a 12,13 percent increase in |
| 4 | MASON, Q.C.: | 4 |  | the ultimate loss numbers which I suspect is |
| 5 | Q. And so this data would be, as you would say, | 5 |  | largely due to increases in reserves and the |
| 6 | less reliable because it's newer data, would | 6 |  | supplemental reserve? |
| 7 | have the reserve and the supplemental | 7 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 8 | reserve where we're trying to estimate what | 8 | A. | Well, I mean, if we go to the next year, |
| 9 | claims are going to be costed out at, is | 9 |  | accident year 2013, you will see that number |
| 10 | that right? | 10 |  | goes up to 380, so this is Appendix 4, is |
| 11 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 11 |  | higher, so - |
| 12 | A. I would say that it's, I describe it as less | 12 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 13 | mature and more subject to change than an | 13 | Q. | Right. And the year before that, just for |
| 14 | older accident year, yes. | 14 |  | the record, is 368 , right, so it's a lower |
| 15 | MASON, Q.C.: | 15 |  | number. |
| 16 | Q. Right. And we see the cost per car at | 16 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 17 | \$396.75, do you see that? | 17 | A. | Yeah, so it goes up and down, it's not |
| 18 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 18 |  | necessarily--and it's a product, as we said |
| 19 | A. I do. | 19 |  | earlier, changes in claims frequency rate |
| 20 | MASON, Q.C.: | 20 |  | over time is affected, of course, the |
| 21 | Q. All right, so if we go one page further, | 21 |  | frequency rate by the weather in that |
| 22 | this is accident year 2015 as of June 30, | 22 |  | winter, so the fact that 2014 may be lower |
| 23 | 2017. | 23 |  | than the 2015 and ' 16 here could be due to |
| 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 24 |  | more reasons than just the case reserve |
| 25 | A. Uh-hm. | 25 |  | estimates. It could be due to the frequency |
|  | Page 150 |  |  | Page 152 |
| 1 | MASON, Q.C.: | 1 |  | in that year as well. |
| 2 | Q. We see the ultimate loss and cost per car at | 2 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 3 | \$413.33? | 3 | Q. | But you looked at this and I take it that in |
| 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 4 |  | 2015-sorry, get on the right page here, at |
| 5 | A. Uh-hm. | 5 |  | 2015 and 2016, the increases that we see in |
| 6 | MASON, Q.C.: | 6 |  | a cost per car for ultimate loss during that |
| 7 | Q. So this would be a little more reliable, I | 7 |  | timeframe is reserves going up and a |
| 8 | take it, than the data that we looked at in | 8 |  | supplemental reserve going up sthat right? |
| 9 | the last page? | 9 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 10 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 10 | A. | It reflects the amounts that have been paid |
| 11 | A. Well the year is a little bit older, more | 11 |  | and the amounts that the case adjuster has |
| 12 | mature. | 12 |  | set, yes, that's what that, there's no-it |
| 13 | MASON, Q.C.: | 13 |  | reflects the data that's reported by the |
| 14 | Q. Right, okay. If we go to the next page, | 14 |  | company. |
| 15 | accident year 2014 as of June 30, 2017, now | 15 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 16 | this figure presumably would be even more | 16 | Q. | If the adjuster and you are too high on that |
| 17 | accurate, is that right, because more of the | 17 |  | number - |
| 18 | claims have settled at this point? | 18 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 19 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 19 | A. | On which number? |
| 20 | A. Yes, that's correct, yeah. | 20 |  | ON, Q.C.: |
| 21 | MASON, Q.C.: | 21 | Q. | Sorry, the subsequent years, at 411, 413, |
| 22 | Q. Right. And so, we see there a much lower | 22 |  | sorry, 413.33 and 396.75, if those numbers |
| 23 | ultimate loss cost payout, \$354.37. | 23 |  | are too high because of the reserve and the |
| 24 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 24 |  | supplemental reserve, and the number should |
| 25 | A. Uh-hm. | 25 |  | be more like 2014 which is 354.37 , that's |


|  | Page 153 |  |  | Page 155 <br> Got you. If the number is used at 350 , cost |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | going to have a significant impact on the | 1 |  |  |
| 2 | return of equity figure that you've put in | 2 |  | per car, that is going to significantly |
| 3 | your report, correct? | 3 |  | change-if we keep the other items steady, |
| 4 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 4 |  | operating expenses, premium, and we just |
| 5 | A. Well each year is independently, so the | 5 |  | adjust in terms of your numbers the cost per |
| 6 | following year, accident year 2013, it was | 6 |  | car, the ultimate loss, at $\$ 350.00$ versus |
| 7 | 380 , higher than the more recent year, so | 7 |  | your estimates that you've put forward, |
| 8 | there are certainly years that will be | 8 |  | that's going to significantly drive up the |
| 9 | higher and lower and of course, as a result | 9 |  | return on equity, correct? That figure? If |
| 10 | of how many accidents and the severity of | 10 |  | we say that the baseline for claims costs in |
| 1 | the accidents that happen in that year. | 11 |  | this province are $\$ 350.00$ per car, as we see |
| 12 | MASON, Q.C.: | 12 |  | in 2014, we keep your calculation for |
| 13 | Q. Right. | 13 |  | premiums steady, we keep your calculation |
| 14 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 14 |  | for operating expenses steady, that is going |
| 15 | A. So it's not unusual to see some differences | 15 |  | to drive up that return on equity which you |
| 16 | from year to year, up and down, but we're | 16 |  | suggested is minus 9 percent, it's going to |
| 17 | looking at how are the average costs | 17 |  | significantly improve the profitability of |
| 18 | increasing for claims settlement over time | 18 |  | the insurers in this province, right? |
| 19 | and there are obviously bumps in that | 19 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 20 | because of the type of claims that might | 20 | A. | Well I think what you're saying is what we |
| 21 | occur that year, but this is not unusual. | 21 |  | presented in Table 1 in our report, you |
| 22 | MASON, Q.C.: | 22 |  | know, there are changes, these are the |
| 23 | Q. Right, but if we look at the first year, | 23 |  | accident year, so for the year with the |
| 24 | which is I think 2012, it's 368 and then we | 24 |  | lower estimate of the ultimate losses, we |
| 25 | go up in 2013, it's 380, and then it's down | 25 |  | have a positive - |
|  | Page 154 |  |  | Page 156 |
| 1 | at 350 in 2014. | 1 |  | N, Q.C.: |
| 2 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 2 |  | Yeah, 6 percent return on equity, right? |
| 3 | A. Uh-hm. | 3 |  | LIOTT: |
| 4 | MASON, Q.C.: | 4 | A. | Yes. And then for the years where it's |
| 5 | Q. It almost sounds like you're saying 350 is | 5 |  | higher, but we looked at each year |
| 6 | an outlier - | 6 |  | individually, so-and clearly the data, the |
| 7 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 7 |  | number of claims that occur and the types of |
| 8 | A. No, I'm not saying that. | 8 |  | claims that do occur are not the same each |
| 9 | MASON, Q.C.: | 9 |  | year. |
| 10 | Q. You're not saying that, okay | 10 |  | N, Q.C.: |
| 1 | MS. ELLIOTT: | 11 | Q. | Right, I'm just saying though if the claim |
| 12 | A. I'm not saying that, I'm just saying that's | 12 |  | reserve and the supplemental reserve is too |
| 13 | likely due to better weather that year or | 13 |  | high and it should be $\$ 350.00$ per car, |
| 14 | lower number of claims or possibly no large | 14 |  | right, that's going to significantly change |
| 15 | claims that year, but the change from year | 15 |  | the return on equity at the end of the day, |
| 16 | to year that we're observing here is not | 16 |  | as you've mentioned, like in 2014 it's a 6 |
| 17 | unusual, but I think it's fair, as you had | 17 |  | percent return on equity, not minus 9 |
| 18 | said, I'm not disagreeing that the more | 18 |  | percent return on equity. |
| 19 | recent years there's more uncertainty in | 19 |  | LLIOTT: |
| 20 | that estimate, it's not as mature compared | 20 | A. | Right, it works both ways. If it's too low, |
| 21 | to the older years, so the 2012 and 2013, | 21 |  | if it should be higher, the profit will be |
| 22 | they're more mature years and those | 22 |  | less. It works both ways, so yes, and when |
| 23 | estimates are less likely to change, but | 23 |  | all of the claims are settled and closed and |
| 24 | they still may change. | 24 |  | we look back and say was this number, you |
| 25 | MASON, Q.C.: | 25 |  | know, how did it change over time from this |




A

Ability - 15:18 Able - 10:19, 15:13, 32:6, 57:9, 103:7, 106:23, 107:3, 132:1, 142:23
Above -41:20, 42:12, 45:5, 54:13, 55:21, 56:9, 56:19, 57:2, 57:22, 58:9
Accept - 128:9
Accepts - 75:18
Accident - 2:21,
3:3, 3:16, 3:17, 4:1, 4:12, 6:11, 10:20,
12:23, 15:2, 40:24,
41:1, 45:18, 58:11,
111:11, 116:7,
119:14, 148:20,
149:14, 149:22,
150:15, 151:9,
153:6, 155:23
Accidents - 3:21,
3:23, 4:6, 70:17,
153:10, 153:11
According - 105:2 3
Accountants - 67:
9
Accounting - 9:1
Accounts - 3:21
Accurate - 15:9,
16:16, 16:17,
45:12, 45:14, 77:8,
150:17
Accurately - 16:4,
63:12
Achieve - 32:7
Achieved - 49:18, 49:25, 50:1, 53:20, 58:19
Achieving - 28:12, 28:23
Acquisition - 94:18
Across - 60:22,
62:9, 62:16, 67:22, 85:20, 94:2, 95:17
Actual - 2:23, 9:12, 9:15, 9:16, 105:11, 111:16, 140:24, 141:12
Actuarial - 115:9, 115:21, 117:18, 119:21, 121:7
Actuaries - 61:2,
67:9, 115:1, 115:7
Actuary - 16:12,
23:9, 62:11, 79:7, 89:12, 113:23, 114:4, 117:20,

119:7, 119:14,
120:21, 121:14,
121:23, 122:17,
122:21, 123:2,
123:8
Add - 71:19, 99:8, 117:10, 141:18, 163:13
Added - 78:24
Addition - 115:10, 116:6
Adds - 97:11
Adequacy - 3:2, 10:18, 12:17, 18:22, 20:3, 20:11, 20:22, 21:9, 22:14, 22:23, 23:17,
23:21, 29:4, 31:17, 109:8, 140:2
Adjust - 111:12, 155:5
Adjuster - 111:7, 111:23, 112:15, 114:10, 114:11, 118:7, 118:23, 120:19, 121:21, 124:17, 145:6, 152:11, 152:16
Adjusters - 115:3, 145:24
Adjusting - 109:18
Adjustment - 83:2 1, 87:13, 141:8, 148:25
Admired - 23:9
Advance - 134:6,
165:22
Advantage - 135:1 9
Advise -91:2, 91:11
Advocate - 162:8,
163:11, 164:11, 165:3
Affect - 134:16
Affected - 151:20, 158:1
Agency - 78:3
Agent - 89:11
Aggregate - 76:7, 78:20, 102:3, 111:9, 112:4, 115:2,
121:22, 122:25,
138:22
Aggregated - 44:2 4, 100:17, 101:10, 102:5, 111:4, 111:8, 112:7, 119:6
Agree - 27:21,
37:9, 64:15, 74:12, 81:11, 99:2, 105:24,

125:22, 134:9, 134:24, 136:12, 157:21
Agreeable - 159:10
Agreed - 107:11
Agreement - 57:10 , 136:5
Ahead - 135:5
Albeit - 97:24,
100:18, 105:12
Alberta-8:17,
20:9, 84:9, 84:11, 85:7, 86:21, 87:14, 89:14, 90:21,
95:22, 97:2, 97:7,
97:17, 98:8, 98:17,
98:23, 99:11, 99:18,
99:24, 100:10,
104:25, 106:12
Allocated - 6:7, 67:22, 76:8, 109:18, 141:7, 148:25
Allow - 25:6
Allowed - 31:14, 48:17, 71:3, 72:16, 85:13, 127:8, 159:15
Allows - 165:16
Alright - 64:21,
75:10, 82:2
Alternatives - 93:1
4
Among - 162:10
Amongst - 100:3
Amount - 4:16,
25:3, 25:7, 25:22,
37:4, 42:4, 56:23,
57:14, 93:9, 111:12,
111:14, 112:13,
118:20, 119:12,
140:24, 140:25,
141:15, 144:18,
144:19, 144:21
Amounts - 1:12,
1:19, 2:2, 4:3, 29:6, 76:6, 110:13,
110:18, 111:2,
111:5, 111:6, 118:23, 119:17, 124:15, 124:16, 126:24, 141:13, 145:13, 148:1, 152:10, 152:11
Analysis - 27:25,
104:19, 105:5, 125:8, 136:22,
146:16, 147:5,
148:9, 148:13
Annual - 87:13
Anticipate - 40:4,

84:20, 129:19
Anticipated - 39:17
, 39:22, 53:14,
127:3, 127:24,
129:15, 144:23
Anyway - 74:7,
106:21
Appears - 72:14,
131:16, 133:3,
133:15, 134:11,
136:7, 157:17
Appendix - 124:25,
125:10, 125:16,
140:9, 140:11,
151:10
Apples - 89:21
Application - 31:14
, 73:12, 100:23,
101:20
Applications - 22:1
4
Applied - 14:2,
124:19, 138:24
Apply - 128:14
Appreciate - 53:11
Apprised - 17:19
Approach - 69:5,
80:9, 164:19,
164:21
Appropriate - 63:1
3, 69:18, 69:19,
72:3, 76:25, 83:22,
89:18, 90:7,
100:10, 102:17,
106:11, 108:3,
136:23, 158:8,
165:10
Appropriateness -
76:13
Approval - 43:1
Approximately -4:
23, 34:9, 50:24,
151:3
Area-81:5
Areas - 26:6,
74:13, 81:16,
163:25
Aren't - 5:12, 29:7,
41:22
Arguing-88:24,
129:6
Argument - 128:6
Arguments - 65:21
Arisen - 65:12
Arising - 165:11,
165:24
Arm - 78:11
Arrangements - 62
:8
Arrive - 139:2
Articles - 80:23

Aspects - 163:25
Assess - 12:5
Assessing - 16:5
Assessment - 3:1, 36:14
Assessments - 15:
4
Assigned - 4:16,
114:10
Associated - 7:22,
7:23, 19:10
Association-47:1
9, 72:20
Assumed - 159:6
Assumption - 10:2
5, 14:1, 35:10,
108:24
Assumptions-8:1
Atlantic - 33:25,
65:10, 72:19, 81:5
Attached - 141:6, 148:17
Attachments - 123
:18
Attendance - 65:9, 84:13
Attribute - 7:1
Attributed - 80:20,
157:18, 157:19
Audit - 77:20,
77:25
Audited - 76:3,
77:22
Auditor - 76:4,
77:8, 77:11, 77:12, 97:14
August - 1:23, 2:3
Authored - 22:1
Auto - 3:5, 4:9, 7:9, 10:16, 11:24, 12:6, 12:14, 26:12,
26:20, 27:15, 28:4,
28:11, 31:24, 34:20,
37:5, 39:2, 45:2,
45:20, 47:2, 50:7,
50:11, 55:16, 55:20,
57:1, 59:1, 62:1,
66:5, 68:14, 81:1,
81:10, 100:20,
110:3, 115:23,
116:12, 123:21
Automobile - 2:16,
3:14, 15:12, 18:9,
32:22, 33:3, 43:2,
51:1, 61:19, 62:18,
77:6, 82:21, 82:23,
83:3, 102:9
Automobiles - 2:9,
82:25, 83:1, 83:6
Available - 6:19,
7:4, 9:10, 11:10,


| 136:21, 137:8, | 166:9 | Comprehend - 146 | Corresponding - 3 | 147:21 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 137:9, 139:3, | Commissions - 4:1 | :6 | 8:6 | Coverage - 2:25, |
| 139:20, 140:18, | 0, 7:17, 10:11, | Comprised - 66:11, | Cost - 16:13, | 87:14, 125:15 |
| 144:21, 145:22, | 85:18, 95:16 | 98:14, 109:19 | 66:19, 66:20, | Coverages - 116:1 |
| 145:24, 146:21, | Communicate - 16 | Comprises - 69:15 | 66:21, 68:8, 75:5, | Create - 119:20 |
| 156:11 | 0:14 | Concern - 63:15 | 84:22, 86:20, | Created - 8:22 |
| Claimant - 121:8, | Companies - 7:11, | Concluded - 89:16 | 89:16, 91:6, 94:21, | Criteria - 97:4 |
| 146:23 | 30:11, 48:16, 49:5, | Concluding - 166: | 95:19, 99:18, 111:1, | Critical - 66:2, |
| Claimants - 146:25 | 53:11, 53:18, 53:22, | 10 | 113:23, 113:24, | 69:17 |
| Clarification - 1:7, | 57:25, 59:11, 60:20, | Conclusion - 11:7 | 125:22, 126:12, | Cross - 11:21, |
| 1:14, 2:7, 83:12 | 61:11, 62:13, 62:20, | Conditions - 66:11 | 126:13, 126:23, | 69:3, 112:19, 113:6, |
| Clarify - 81:23 | 63:15, 64:24, 65:3, | Connection - 69:7 | 128:7, 130:16, | 161:14 |
| Clarity - $3: 18$ | 68:1, 68:3, 71:10, | Consider - 16:10, | 140:24, 141:6, | Current - 165:4 |
| Click - 47:12 | 77:4, 79:25, 80:1, | 164:22 | 141:13, 141:19, | Currently - 93:11, |
| Clientele - 164:5, | 91:16, 91:21, 92:1, | Consideration - 15 | 147:3, 149:1, | 96:1 |
| 164:14 | 94:16, 94:19, | 7:13, 157:20 | 149:16, 150:2, | Cycle - 26:2, 26:10, |
| Clients - 62:8, | 95:19, 100:22, | Considered - 158: | 150:23, 152:6, | 26:13, 27:14, |
| 62:9, 62:15, 63:17 | 111:5, 112:12, | 2 | 155:1, 155:5, | 29:19, 29:20, 30:5, |
| Clock - 159:2 | 113:22, 114:7, | Consistent - 133:6, | 158:10 | 30:6, 30:7, 30:8, |
| Close - 109:24, | 115:6, 117:15 | 134:2 | Costed - 149:9 | 50:10, 59:1 |
| 111:1, 128:24, | Company - 2:24 | Consistently - 30:2 | Costs - 7:24, | Cycles - 23:23, |
| 166:4 | 5:11, 5:19, 8:14, | 2 | 10:21, 78:20, | 24:12, 24:13, 25:14 |
| Closed - 1:25, | 13:11, 46:10, 46:25, | Constitutes - 106: | 82:23, 86:9, 90:13, |  |
| 3:21, 18:16, | 47:1, 60:4, 60:8, | 16 | 94:18, 97:15, | D |
| 109:24, 111:11, | 62:24, 63:2, 63:14, | Constitutional - 19 | 105:11, 107:1, | Damages - 145:20 |
| 111:15, 119:1, | 64:11, 64:14, 64:19, | :25, 32:12, 32:15, | 107:15, 109:9, | Dark - 131:19 |
| 119:13, 146:22, | 64:23, 64:25, 67:2, | 33:19, 112:18 | 115:5, 126:19, $144: 17$ 144:18, | Date - 6:20, 10:22, |
| 156:23 | 76:4, 77:21, 77:23, | Consult - 74:2 Consultant - 7 | 144:17, 144:18, | 135:13 |
| $\text { Co - } 22$ | 10 | Consultative - 68.2 | Couldn't - 42:12 | Dated - 1:23, 2:2 |
| Coalition-128:5 | 114:12, 114:15, | 5 | Counsel - 74:3, | Day - 4:22, 64:7, |
| Collected - 4:3, | 146:3, 152:14 | Consumer - 162:8, | 159:23, 161:11, |  |
| 49:18, 76:18 | Company's - 76:23 | 163:11, 164:11, | 161:18, 161:19, | Days - 32-21 |
| Collection - 78:4 | , 77:11 | 165:3 | 161:20, 161:21, | 165:25 |
| Collision - 116:2 | Comparable - 14:2 | Consumers - 45:2 | 162:11, 162:15, |  |
| Collusion - 65:21 | 1 | 2, 164:12 | 162:25, 163:1, | $6: 1,60: 20,65: 4$ |
| Column - 37:17 | Compare - 2:22, | Contained - 13:6 | 163:3, 163:12, | 72:23, 159:24, |
| Come - 1:13, 44:4, | 6:17, 9:11, 89:18, | Contemplate - 136 | 163:20, 163:23, | 161:6 |
| 101:22, 116:17, | 97:1 | :25 | 164:22, 164:25, | Dealt - 161:3 |
| 126:19, 163:21, | Compared - 125:1 | Contingent - 85:12 | 165:5 | December-6:21, |
| 163:22, 165:9 | 5, 154:20 | , 99:5, 101:4 | Counting - 3:9 | 132:2, 132:12 |
| Comes - 34:20, | Comparing - 89:21 | Continual - 40:7 | Country - 8:8, | 132:18, 133:5, |
| 34:21, 115:15, | Comparison - 4:15 | Continue - 71:3, | 25:17, 28:14, | $133: 17,134: 13$ |
| $118: 12,128: 14$, 136.9 | , 97:7 | 72:13, 73:22, | 60:22, 62:9, 65:12, | Decide - 73:19, |
|  | Comparisons - 9 | 83: | 85:20, 94:2, 95:17 | 74:3 |
| 123:3, 134:7, | 8, 163:8 Compiled - 7 | $\begin{aligned} & 83: 16,1 \\ & 159: 10 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 85: 20,94: 2,95: 17 \\ & \text { 148:9 } \end{aligned}$ | Decision - 33:2, |
| 135:21, 139:16, | 76:19, 92:2 | Continued - 129:2 | Couple - 88:21 | 7:25, 89:2, 89:3, |
| 145:7 | Compiles - 13:12 | 1, 129:23, 130:18, | Course - $3: 23$, | J2:15, 102:21, |
| Comment - 72:5, | Complete - 3:8, | 133:20, 135:23, | 41:4, 85:2, 98:19, | 104:2, 104:9, |
| 162:5 | 89:13, 107:21 | 136:1 | 110:14, 142:9, | $\begin{aligned} & 104: 2,104: 9 \\ & 157: 24 \end{aligned}$ |
| Commercial - 83:1, | Completely - 17:2, | Continuous - 130: | 151:20, 153:9, | ecline - |
| 83:3, 100:19, | 60:25, 63:11, 63:21, | 1 | 159:12 | 29:14, 130:11, |
| 100:20 | 109:23 | Contract - 78:3 | Court - 145:8, | $130: 15,130: 17$ |
| Commission - 82:2 | Completing - 6:22 | Contribute - 90:24, | 146:1, 146:16, | 133:20, 134:5 |
| 0, 85:11, 85:13, | Complex - 83:2 | 99:14 | 146:22, 147:1, | 134:6, 135:12, |
| 85:17, 94:17, 99:5, | Component - 10:1 | Contributes - 96:1 | 147:11, 147:12, | 135:23, 136:1, |
| 101:5, 164:9 | 1, 10:12, 85:14, | 9 | 148:10 | 136:7, 136:10, |
| Commissioner - 1 | 90:11, 98:18, 99:4 | Conversation - 12 | Courtroom - 70:1, | $136: 12,136: 15$ |
| 1:16, 73:2, 164:4 | Components - 5:1 | 0:15 | 70:5 | Declined - 44:12, |
| Commissioners - | 4, 94:12 | Copy -9:3, 102:23 | Courts - 145:19, | $44: 21,44: 22 \text {, }$ |


| 44:23, 135:22, | 163:24 | 143:15, 147:19, | Efficiency - 161:10 | Estimating - 111:1 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 136:16, 157:16 | Differently -98:13 | 148:13, 159:23, | , 161:15, 162:20, |  |
| Declining - 8:3, | Difficult - 24:17, | 160:1, 162:23 | 163:14, 164:18 | Et - 40:21 |
| 144:23, 145:3 | 24:18, 131:12, | Downs - 25:16 | Efficient - 161:25, | Evaluate - 119:11 |
| Decrease - 122:22, | 146:5 | Downtown - 86:8 | 162:14, 164:21, | Events - 3:22 |
| 132:3, 134:12, | Dig - 14:9, 17:15, | Drive - 106:2, | 164:23 | Everybody - 1:3, |
| 135:20 | 24:7 | 155:8, 155:15 | Elliot - 108:14 | 108:17 |
| Decreases - 117:6 | Direction - 161:24, | Driver - 98:22 | Elliott's - 11:9 | Evidence - 12:16, |
| Deductible - 1:19, | 164:9 | Driving - 147:22, | Empty - 81:7 | 26:9, 27:13, 58:15, |
| 71:8 | Disagreeing - 154: | 147:25 | Encompassing - 1 | 58:18, 70:3, 71:2, |
| Deeper - 16:21 | 18 | Drop - 35:12, 39:7, | 27:1 | 71:24, 71:25, |
| Defensive - 70:23 | Disclose - 61:20 | 39:10, 39:22, 40:4, | Encourages - 89:1 | 72:23, 73:7, |
| Definitely - 21:23, | Discussing - 7:6, | 41:1, 44:1, 80:16, | 0 | 102:15, 113:21, |
| 52:17, 55:7, 59:18 | 55:2, 55:6 | 129:19, 129:21, | Ending - 2:18, | 114:3, 114:18, |
| Delay - 165:13 | Discussions - 74:2 | 129:23, 130:1, | 10:20, 140:10, | 115:13, 128:9, |
| Deliberately - 27:1 | 0, 160:6, 160:9 | 130:11, 132:18, | 140:12 | 137:6, 146:19, |
| 2 | Disproved - 12:16 | 132:24 | Ensure - 164:1 | 147:11, 147:19 |
| Derivation - 78:17 | Distant - 62:17 | Dropped - 35:13, | ENTERED - 33:15, | Examination - 69:3 |
| Derived - 10:5 | Divided - 78:20 | 39:19, 79:13, | 87:22 | , 73:4, 112:19, |
| Describe - 149:12 | Division - 8:10 | 79:14, 79:15, 79:24 | Entire - 8:8, 8:14, | 113:6, 161:14 |
| Described - 66:10, | Document - 32:23, | Dropping - 72:2 | 26:10 | Examine - 11:21, |
| 66:13 | 33:4, 33:6, 38:23, | Drops - 144:22 | Entity - 62:15, | 100:11 |
| Description-1:24, | 102:24, 103:6, | Due - 7:1, 41:2, | 88:16 | Examining - 70:2 |
| 23:22 | 104:5, 112:24, | 83:2, 90:15, | Equal - 84:21, | Example - 16:2, |
| Determine - 147:6 | 113:3 | 100:21, 151:5, | 125:24 | 17:1, 18:23, 24:3, |
| Determined - 28:1 | Documentation - 3 | 151:23, 151:25, | Equate - 50:24, | 38:21, 68:11, 82:6, |
| 3 | 7:16, 48:9, 72:23, | 154:13 | 52:11 | 116:2 |
| Determining - 5:15 | 73:8, 127:14 | Duty - 15:6 | Equated - 52:8 | Exceed - 53:6 |
| , 69:17, 109:8, | Documents - 123:1 |  | Equates - 34:8 | Exceeded - 30:12, |
| 110:7, 136:23, | 1, 123:19 | E | Equities - 66:4 | 30:18 |
| 136:24 | Doesn't - 28:21 |  | Ernst - 77:15 | Exception - 13:14 |
| Didn't - 3:8, 14:9, | 69:1, 75:19, 76:11, | $3: 15,4: 1,6: 4,8: 9$ | Essentially - 79:7 | Exceptional - 32:6 |
| 19:5, 20:17, 23:19, | 77:24, 78:2, 83:15, | $9: 13,13: 11,21: 22$ | Establish - 50:11, | Excess - 5:3, |
| 38:5, 38:13, 39:23, | 92:20, 97:20, 115:4, | $31: 8,31: 10,31: 20,$ | 69:14, 129:8 | 37:20, 42:4, 45:4, |
| 40:4, 48:8, 54:1, | 116:17 | $40: 24,75: 25,76: 4$ | Established - 55:2 | 45:21, 48:23, 56:8, |
| $\begin{aligned} & 61: 20,83: 20,91: 11, \\ & 94: 8,103: 4, \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Dollar - 5:1, 9:13, } \\ & \text { 9:25, 10:1, 42:3, } \end{aligned}$ | 76:8, $77: 5,86: 5$, | $2,65: 14$ <br> Estimate | $56: 10,57: 5$ <br> Exclude - 27:12 |
| 104:23, 104:24, | 56:22, 57:14, | 97:10, 101:15, 110:19, 110.24 | $4: 5,6: 8,6: 18,9: 8$ | $\text { 139:20, } 140:$ |
| 105:1, 105:3, 114:1, | 140:24, 140:25, |  | 9:14, 9:18, 10:5, | 140:3 |
| 122:1, 129:19, | 141:12, 141:15 | 114:14, 146:18, | 40:25, 51:3, 55:15, | Excluding - 139:5, |
| 140:23, 140:25 | Dollars - 4:24, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 114:14, 146:18, } \\ & 147: 15 . ~ 148: 11 \end{aligned}$ | 110:25, 117:19, | 140:15 |
| Difference - 7:1, | 4:25, 41:21, 42:12, |  | 117:23, 118:2, | Exclusively - 136:8 |
| 9:13, 16:1, 79:20, | 45:4, 45:21, 54:15, |  | 118:24, 121:6, | Executive - 33:4 |
| 90:2, 91:12, 92:8, | 54:18, 56:8, 56:11, | $9: 21,65: 7,66: 10,$ | 121:15, 124:11, | Executives - 67:3, |
| 92:18, 94:19, 95:6, | 141:23, 141:25 | 91:18, 151:19, | 124:18, 125:13, | 67:12 |
| 95:21, 96:16, | Donald - 65:20, | 158:9 | 125:14, 125:19, | Exhibit - 6:20, 7:5, |
| 96:19, 97:18, | 65:22 | Early - 133:15 | 127:22, 138:25, | 32:20, 32:25, |
| $\begin{aligned} & 97: 19,98: 8,98: 22, \\ & 106: 16 \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Don't - 3:6, 13:4, } \\ & \text { 14:17, 16:9, 16:18, } \end{aligned}$ | Earmarking - 8:15 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 139:17, 144:2, } \\ & \text { 148:5, 149:8, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 33: 14,33: 15, \\ & 54: 25,55: 6,87: 21 \end{aligned}$ |
| 106:16 <br> Differences - 52:15 | 14:17, 16:9, 16:18, 16:21, 16:22, | Earn - 8:7, 8:12, | 148:5, 149:8, 154:20, 155:24, | 54:25, 55:6, 87:21 87:22, 103:24, |
| , 90:14, 100:3, | 35:25, 42:3, 53:11, | 8:20 | 157:1, 157:8 | 112:23, 113:12, |
| 153:15 | 53:18, 53:22, | $\begin{aligned} & \mathrm{E} \\ & 4 . \end{aligned}$ | Estimated - 6:12, | 113:13, 121:5, |
| Different - 18:15, | 54:24, 55:25, 56:3, |  | 11:6, 127:10, 137:7, | 148:17, 148:19 |
| 88:16, 91:20, | 56:22, 57:7, 61:5, |  | 148:1 | Exhibits - 121:1, |
| 91:23, 92:22, | 68:22, 71:21, 72:3, | 49:16, 53:7, 54:19, | Estimates - 16:13, | 141:5 |
| 93:19, 94:2, 94:13, | 79:25, 81:7, 86:25, | $54: 20,55: 16$ | 109:25, 111:8, | Exiting - 24:22 |
| 94:14, 95:20, 99:9, | 87:8, 96:6, 102:21, | $55: 19,57: 1,124: 6$ | 114:11, 117:16, | Expect - 25:8, |
| 105:5, 106:15, | 116:16, 133:19, | Earnings - 58:1 | 117:20, 127:15, | 81:15, 82:13, |
| 110:25, 123:19, | 136:4, 137:25, | Easier - 108:12 | 128:24, 129:4, | 137:16 |
| 139:13, 139:16, | 141:12, 141:21, | Effective - 135:13 | 144:11, 151:25, | Expectation-101: |
| 161:13, 163:3, | 143:4, 143:12, | Effectively - 140:7 | 154:23, 155:7 | 6 |


| Expected - 5:18, | 138:21 | 13:15, 22:22, | 142:8, 142:21, | 18, |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 5:25, 14:21, 126:6, | Filed - 32:14, | 53:24, 71:24, 72:1, | 152:4, 157:7 | 122:18, 125:21, |
| 147:4 | 111:15 | 128:22, 137:2, | 161:12, 162:21, | 127:13, 144:14, |
| Experience - 4:22, | Files - 109:24, | 155:7, 158:10, | 162:23, 163:24, | 145:1, 155:1, |
| 53:17, 59:17, 59:20 | 146:21, 146:23 | 165:25 | 165:22, 166:1 | 157:10 |
| Expert-55:12, | Filing-48:21, | Found - 17:19, | GISA - 7:4, 7:12, | Government - 157: |
| 70:9, 72:3 | 128:13 | 102:16 | 13:12, 14:8, 15:8, |  |
| Expert's - 70:3 | Financial - 76:2 | Four-13:16, | 17:13, 62:14, 75:6, | Graph - 39:8, |
| Explain - $39: 18$, | Find -68:22, 93:8, | 33:25, 95:12, | 75:12, 75:18, 76:11, | 129:11, 130:25, |
| 135:2 | 100:11, 103:7, | 95:14, 98:15 | 76:16, 76:22, | 131:3, 131:4, |
| Express - 120:10 | 122:4, 146:5, | Fraize - 1:11, | 77:19, 77:24, 78:2, | 131:6, 131:12, |
| Expressed - 88:22 | 164:15 | 68:21, 71:4, 164:7 | 79:25, 91:18, 92:3, | 131:15, 133:13, |
| Extent - 99:14 | Findings - 4:11, | Freeze - 42:24 | 105:14, 110:6, | 134:20, 135:3, |
| Eyesight - 131:14 | 16:17 | Frequency - 35:13, | 112:5, 112:8, | 136:6 |
|  | Finds - 89:4 | 39:7, 39:11, 39:19, | 118:14, 118:20, | Graphically - 130:2 |
| F | 104:11, 104:16 | 40:5, 40:8, 41:8, | 120:24, 121:19, |  |
| Factors - 66:2, | Fine - 16:24, 104:8, | 44:1, 129:23, | 121:20, 122:5, | Greater - 86:10, |
| 69:17, 105:25, | 143:16, 160:12 | 130:1, 130:11, | 122:10, 123:3, | 116:2 |
| 106:25, 108:19, | Finesse - 15:18 <br> Fingertips - 54.25 | 130:16, 130:17, $131: 21,133: 14$, | 123:6, 124:4, 124.7 125.7, | Grey - 135:8 <br> Grips - 163.21 |
| 109:8, 125:24, | Firm-69:8 | 133:16, 133:19, | 142:10, 142:12 | 163:23 |
| 26:17, 134:16 | Firmer - 144:11 | 135:13, 135:20, | GISA's - 6:18, | Gross - 142:1 |
| Fair - 11:23, 14:17, | First-3:11, 3:14, | 144:23, 145:1, | 6:19, 77:12 | Group -62:6, 78:8 |
| 15:9, 17:17, 22:15, | 6:13, 11:13, 11:15, | 151:19, 151:21, | Gittens - 11:12, | Guess - 1:3, 16:10, |
| 35:10, 36:14, 48:7, | 75:3, 83:12, 83:15, | 151:25, 157:14, | 11:14, 72:25, 73:9, | 18:4, 51:9, 76:10, |
| 51:3, 52:9, 58:8, | 125:10, 148:19, | 157:16, 157:17, | 73:16, 73:24, | 84:18, 86:25, |
| 60:8, 64:11, 84:8, | 153:23 | 157:19, 157:25 | 74:15, 74:21, | 92:25, 134:3, |
| 86:23, 87:4, 97:1, | Fiscal - 10:20, | Friend - 74:10, | 143:8, 164:7 | 141:17, 146:5, |
| 129:3, 129:8, | 140:10 | 165:2 | Give - 27:25, | 165:6 |
| 154:17, 164:9 | Five-2:22, 6:16, | Front - 35:25, 56:1, | 55:14, 57:9, 58:11, |  |
| Fairly - | 7:14, 9:14, 13:17, | 56:4, 57:8, 58:6, | 164:9 | H |
| Fairness - 162:18, | 34:22, 44:25, 45:1, | 102:21 | Gives - 48:12 |  |
| 163:4 | 45:7, 73:18, 74:1, | Full-3:7, 26:13, | GLYLNN - 160:25 |  |
| Far-53:6, 71:23, | 83:13, 115:24, | 30:7, 30:8, 50:10, | Glynn-1:4, 1:5, | $98: 20,128: 20,$ |
| 114:17 | 116:11, 117:6, | 58:25, 128:18 | 2:5, 11:8, 32:24, | 135:9, 165:25 |
| Feel - 15:5, 16:22, | 117:10, 125:2, | Fully - 62:9, 115:4, | 33:5, 33:9, 33:13, | Halfway - 122:20 |
| 94:9 | 125:12, 138:5 |  | 87:16, 87:20, | Handling - 7:23, |
| Fees - 98:19 | Fixed - 18:5, 90: | Function-71:5 | 103:5, 103:11, | 90:23 |
| Felt - 17:10, 54:6 | Flat - $135: 10$ <br> Flattened - 133:16, | Funny-17:5 Further - $73: 4$ | 103:15, 103:19, 103:23, 104:3, | Happening - 40:19, |
| FELTHAM - 159:1, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Flattened - 133:16, } \\ & \text { 133:20 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Further - 73:4, } \\ & \text { 73:11, 74:13, } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 103:23, 104:3, } \\ & \text { 112:22, 113:2, } \end{aligned}$ | 133:14 |
| 159:7, 159:17, | Flawed-91:25 | 73:11, 74.161 .6 | $\begin{aligned} & 112: 22,113: 2, \\ & 113: 11,131: 2, \end{aligned}$ | Happy -89:2 |
| 159:21, 160:11, | 92:3 | Future - 15:2, | 131:8, 143:2, | 108:10, 158:20 |
| 160:16, 160:20, | Flow - 118:5, 127:9 | 53:18, 70:7, 89:14, | 143:10, 143:17, | Hard - 24:13, |
| 162:7 | Focus - 30:5, 43:6 | 137:17, 159:9 | $143: 21,160: 1$ | 24:16, 24:20, |
| Fifty - 34:22, 54:17 | Focused - 136:3 | 137.17, 59.9 | $\begin{aligned} & 1450: 2 \\ & 160: 4 \end{aligned}$ | 24:21, 24:22, |
| Figure - $36: 25$, | Focussed-62:17, | G | Gone - 115:22, | 39:18, 71:24 |
| 55:13, 107:3, | 68:24 |  | 146:17, 147:12, | sn't - 159:13 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { 107:19, 143:25, } \\ & \text { 150:16. 153:2, } \end{aligned}$ | Follow - 38:13, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Gander - 86:10 } \\ & \text { Gap - } 5: 1,128: 20 \end{aligned}$ | 148:10, 163:4 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Haven't - 18:21, } \\ & \text { 18:22, 51:24, } \end{aligned}$ |
| $155: 9$ | 101:19, 125:21 | General - 10:12, | Good - 1:3, 20:9, | $146: 14$ |
| Figures - 13:3, | Following - 39:16, | $78: 2,85: 1$ | 29:11, 29:12, 30:21, | Head - 51:20, 67:7, |
| 53:2, 53:6, 54:2, | 43:3, 108:8, $153: 6$ | Generally - 95:17, | 48:12, 54:8, 116:2 | 102:20, 109:13 |
| 83:21, 98:11, | Footnote - 2.1 | 161:22 | Got - 14:6, 27:7, | Healthy - 34:19 |
| 118:12, 144:4, | Forecast-125:17 | Generated - 71:9 |  | Hear - 71:6, 71:13 |
| 158:12, 158:14 | Forecasting - 140: | Get-6:25, 14:4, | 30:3, 31:16, 43:19, | Heard - 80:22, |
| File - 110:19, |  | 24:18, 35:20, |  | 129:25, 137:7 |
| 110:24, 111:2, | Forgeron-68:11, 80.24 | $41: 15,50: 9,58: 8$ | 60:7, 63:3, 64:22, | Hearing-2:13, |
| 111:7, 111:23, | 80:24 ${ }^{\text {Formal - } 72.22,}$ | 62:22, 63:6, 63:19, | 86:3, 90:3, 94:23, | 18:25, 19:11, 20:22, |
| 112:13, 112:14, | Formal-72:22, | $71: 15,82: 12,86: 5,$ | 96:2, 96:14, 98:7, | 21:4, 21:22, 21:23, |
| 112:15, 118:21, |  | 101:13, 109:22, |  | 33:15, 46:12, |
| 118:24, 119:19, | Forward-10:22, | 117:14, 118:5, | 120 | 47:14, 55:4, 56:2, |


| 70:15, 70:18, | 148:2 | Inaudible - 143:9 | 43:2, 50:8, 53:11, | - |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 84:10, 87:22, | Hold - 125:23 | Income - 4:4, 5:23, | 57:25, 59:2, 59:11, | 5:23, 7:25, 8:1, 8:2, |
| 161:15, 161:24, | Holders - 5:12, | 7:25, 8:1, 8:2, 8:5, | 60:14, 60:15, 61:11, | 8:5, 8:6, 8:10, 8:12, |
| 164:23 | 67:16, 68:2, 114:16 | 11:1 | 61:19, 62:13, | 8:20, 10:3, 11:1, |
| Hearings - 18:23, | Honour - 23:10 | Incorrect - 92:3, | 62:14, 62:19, | 158:13 |
| 65:8, 107:9 | Hope -63:25 | 92:5, 92:21 | 63:15, 64:24, 65:3, | Investments - 8:10 |
| Held - 40:20 | Hour - 56:16, 74:7 | Incorrectly - 1:21 | 67:13, 68:1, 68:3, | , 8:13, 8:15, 8:16, |
| Help - 53:17, 55:12 | Hour's - 56:2 | Increase - 6:15, | 71:9, 77:6, 78:2, | 8:17, 8:19 |
| Helpful-51:17, | Human - 15:14 | 25:11, 25:20, 38:11, | 79:24, 80:1, 81:1, | Invite - 163:5 |
| 107:24 | Hundred -54:17, | 38:15, 38:17, 43:4, | 81:10, 86:9, 102:9, | Isn't-20:4, 95:10, |
| Here's - 50:5 | 56:8, 56:11, 57:5 | 106:8, 114:4, | 111:5, 113:22, | 146:15 |
| He's - 22:7, 22:15, | Hundreds - 41:21, | 122:22, 123:2, | 114:15, 115:23, | Issue - 17:20, 29:3, |
| 23:9, 68:11, 81:9, | 42:11, 45:3, 45:20, | 129:7, 133:14, | 145:6 | 65:12, 68:24, |
| 123:5, 143:20, | 54:15 | 137:9, 137:11, | Insurer - 8:9, 8:15, | 72:14, 72:15, |
| 165:6 |  | 139:3, 139:20, | 31:6, 31:19, 34:7, | 72:17, 73:5, 88:3, |
| Hide - 59:22 | I | 140:18, 144:15, | 101:21 | 93:10, 100:7, |
| High - 8:4, 26:20, |  | 151:3 | Insurers - 7:12, | 122:15, 128:12, |
| 27:13, 29:19, | IBC - 13:12, 15:9, | Increased - 13:19, | 8:7, 11:24, 12:7, | 159:22, 164:11, |
| 29:25, 37:9, 37:11, | 17:13, 39:8, 44:2, | 137:10 | 12:14, 12:18, 16:6, | 164:20, 164:21, |
| 37:13, 38:2, 40:21, | 68:4, 68:17, 75:5, | Increases - 25:7, | 24:21, 24:24, | 165:4 |
| 93:8, 126:16, | 75:12, 75:18, | 117:4, 151:5, 152:5 | 25:16, 26:2, 26:12, | Issues - 70:1, |
| 127:16, 127:23, | 75:25, 76.24 77:22, 78.4 | Increasing-6:16, | 26:20, 26:21, | 73:11, 157:12, |
| 128:8, 128:25, | 76:24, 77:22, 78 | 43:12, 137:20, | 27:16, 28:4, 28:11, | 161:11 |
| 129:19, 131:20, | 78:7, 78:11, 801 | 138:12, 153:18 | 29:7, 31:7, 31:25, | Item - 18:5, 118:22 |
| 144:2, 152:16, | 83:3, 89:10, 92:2, $105: 14$ 110:5, | Independence - 70 | 34:20, 39:2, 40:20, | Items - 155:3 |
| 152:23, 156:13 | 105:14, 110:5, | :4, 70:12, 70:14, | 43:8, 45:2, 45:20, | I've - 14:6, 18:14, |
| Higher-9:16, | 112:4, 113:22, | 72:15, 73:5, 73:11 | 47:2, 50:12, 51:1, | 23:16, 31:16, |
| 24:17, 41:3, 48:16, | 117:15, 117:17, | Independently - 63 | 55:16, 55:20, 57:1, | 43:19, 80:22, 95:7, |
| 48:19, 49:6, 51:14, | 117:20, 117:23, | :12, 77:23, 119:11, | 60:21, 62:2, 63:1, | 98:7, 107:9, |
| 52:17, 52:21, | 118:11, 119:2, | 119:15, 119:16, | 64:12, 66:5, 68:14, | 120:14, 120:17, |
| 81:17, 81:24, 82:4, | 120:1, 121:12, | 121:13, 153:5 | 78:8, 78:9, 108:21, | 122:18, 129:25 |
| 84:21, 84:22, | 123:2, 148:8, | Indicated - 146:9, | 110:4, 129:9, 146:8, |  |
| 84:23, 85:6, 86:21, |  | 160:6 | 155:18 | J |
| 89:16, 91:5, 91:7, | IBCCs - 80:24, 113:23, 114:4, | Indicating - 146:16 | Insures - 75:1 |  |
| 97:17, 98:4, 99:15, | 1117:20, 119:7, | $147: 13$ | Intact -59:11, | Jr - 65:20 |
| 99:19, 105:12, | 119:14, 120:21, | Indication-144:16 | 60:20 |  |
| 118:13, 127:9, | 121.6, 121:14, | Individually - 156: | Integrity - 59:16, | $\text { June - } 3: 6,3: 25 \text {, }$ |
| 138:12, 151:11, | 121.6, 121.14, |  | 63:8 |  |
| 153:7, 153:9, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 121:23, 122:17, } \\ & \text { 122:21, 123:8 } \end{aligned}$ | Industry - $3: 4$, | Intended - 49:25 | 9:11, 10:21, 131:18, |
| 156:5, 156:21, | 122:21, 123:8 | 28:22, 37:5, 75:4, | Intent-26:25 | 132:12, 132:23, |
| 157:2, 157:5, 157:9 | IBNR - 111:16 | 87:13, 89:10, 102:5 | Intention - 54:6, | 133:24, 140:10, |
| Highest - 81:1, | I'd-46:1, 50:25, | Influenced -64:3 | 59:18, 59:22 | 140:11, 140:12, |
| 81:9, 81:12, 81:25 | 133:12, 138:5, | Initial -41:16, | Interchangeably - | 148:20, 149:22, |
| Highlights - 2:12 | 141:17, 142:7, | 157:1 | 10:2 | 150:15 |
| Highly - 69:16, | 142:20 | Initially - 127:24 | Interest - 161:10, | Jurisdiction - 20:1 |
| 146:7 | I'll - 1:3, 28:1, | Injured - 128:5 | 164:23 | 2, 148:11 |
| Hindsight - 2:20, | 62:22, 107:25, | Injury - 116:3, | Interesting - 146:5 | Jurisdictions -18: |
| 9:9, 12:22, 91:15, | 164:25 | 116:12, 117:7, | Interrupt -96:6 | , 94 |
| 93:3, 94:25, 126:4, | Impact - 153:1 | 118:13, 129:20, | Intervenor-71:6 | 5:20 |
| 127:2, 127:22, | 28:16 | 144:18, 144:21, | Introduced - 135:1 | K |
| 129:18, 135:19 |  | 145:24 | 6, 136:14 |  |
| Hire - 77:15 | Important - 3:14, | Innuendo - 71:23 | Introduction - 39:1 | KEAN - 9:2, 113:7 |
| Historic-2:15, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Important - } 3: 14 \\ & \text { 71:1, 135:15, } \end{aligned}$ | Inside - 146:2 | 6, 40:5, 40:7, | KENNEDY - 69:24, |
| 12:6 | 71:1, 135:15, | Inspect - 76:23 | 135:14 | 162:4, 163:9, 164:3 |
| Historical - 23:20, |  | Insufficient - 25:19 | Investigate - 14:20 | Knows - 69:9 |
| 53:19 | 105:6 | , 111:10 | Investigated - 17:6 |  |
| Historically - 120:1 |  | Insurance - 4:8, | Investigating -65: | L |
|  | $155: 17$ | 5:11, 15:12, 18:9, | 1,65:20 |  |
| History - $3: 12$, |  | 23:23, 24:12, | Investigation - 62: |  |
| 12:23, 14:12, | 24:24 | 24:18, 25:13, 30:11, | 24, 64:12, 65:2, | 105:23, 123:20 |
| 101:2, 126:16, | Inadequate - 115:4 | 32:22, 33:3, 37:5, |  | Lack - 70:12 |

Laid - 165:16
Language - 70:21,
114:25
Lapse - 128:16
Large - 10:12,
128:21, 154:14
Largely - 151:5
Larger - 90:12,
90:13, 90:22
Largest - 59:5,
59:10
Lawyers - 47:19,
72:20, 128:5,
161:20
Lead - 19:20, 21:17
Leave - 136:18,
164:25
Leaving - 158:12
Led - 80:16
Left - 6:2, 94:20,
95:18, 135:7
Let's - 13:5, 38:20,
46:7, 50:20, 70:25,
74:24, 81:8, 81:9,
115:23, 134:23,
159:8
Letter - 1:23, 2:2, 12:4
Level - 4:12, 10:18,
24:4, 42:25, 70:4,
118:7, 133:22
Levels - 2:15, 3:12,
5:8, 12:6, 27:5,
58:19, 133:4
Light - 20:23
Likelihood - 157:3
Line - 88:20,
131:20, 135:8
Lines - 67:23,
115:18
Lobby -68:4, 78:7
Logo - 62:5
Long - 15:12, 64:7,
116:4, 137:19,
163:1, 163:2,
163:7, 163:8,
164:19, 166:4
Longer - 54:9
Looked - 4:22,
12:4, 13:24, 25:13,
86:19, 89:19, 91:5,
119:6, 121:19,
123:5, 123:13,
140:8, 140:9,
150:8, 152:3, 156:5
Looking - 3:12,
4:2, 5:16, 5:22,
9:10, 13:15, 23:25,
28:2, 31:6, 38:23,
40:24, 53:3, 91:3,
98:9, 100:6, 104:1,

111:17, 111:20, 111:21, 112:2,
112:21, 113:16,
126:5, 128:22,
131:6, 131:16,
131:17, 137:14,
138:15, 139:14,
139:19, 148:3,
153:17, 157:21,
159:2, 162:19
Losses - 4:5, 4:24,
5:3, 5:17, 5:25,
9:19, 10:24, 25:5, 25:21, 38:18,
53:13, 126:4,
126:5, 127:2,
127:22, 129:16,
155:24
Lost - 118:22,
131:13
Lot - 161:17
Low - 37:23, 38:9,
88:24, 115:4,
120:19, 122:25,
129:1, 146:10,
156:20
Lower - 7:14, 9:15, 29:6, 30:5, 30:6,
55:8, 81:16, 82:5, 82:14, 84:23, 90:24, 93:14, 94:8, 94:17, 97:15, 97:24, 98:1, 98:16, 105:12, 106:1, 106:6, 108:18,
126:7, 133:25,
138:12, 150:22,
151:14, 151:22,
153:9, 154:14,
155:24, 157:2,
157:5
Lowered - 97:23

## M

Madam - 1:6,
11:20, 68:19, 69:11,
69:25, 73:2, 74:6,
74:24, 108:10,
159:2, 160:23,
162:5, 163:18,
165:2
Mainly - 7:1
Major - 98:17
Make - 1:8, 2:7,
15:7, 16:4, 16:14,
30:21, 31:7, 31:9,
31:20, 31:22, 63:3,
64:18, 73:10,
73:12, 76:24,
92:20, 92:24,
94:19, 95:21, 97:7,

97:12, 97:20, 98:7, 100:9, 101:8,
101:20, 108:12,
111:8, 118:2, 132:1, 159:8, 161:24, 162:5, 163:25
Making - 9:18,
45:3, 51:1, 53:15,
58:14, 162:13
Manage - 78:4
Managed - 8:11,
26:7, 48:21
Management - 60:
15
Mandate - 50:7,
94:9
Mandated - 42:25
Mandatory - 80:9, 91:23
Many - 18:10,
129:17, 134:16,
139:13, 139:15,
147:24, 153:10,
162:23
Mark - 32:25,
33:14, 87:17,
87:21, 103:24
MARKED - 33:15,
87:22, 113:13,
136:14, 148:19
Market - 24:16,
24:23, 144:3
Markets - 24:13,
24:14, 24:20, 24:22
Marsh - 59:4,
59:14, 59:25, 60:1,
60:12, 61:10,
61:25, 62:6, 62:10, 63:16, 64:5
Massive - 39:22,
40:4, 44:1
Materially - 35:14
Materials - 13:7
Math - 51:24, 79:6
Matters - 74:9
Mature - 144:10,
149:13, 150:12,
154:20, 154:22
Mclennan - 59:5,
59:14, 59:25, 60:2,
60:13, 61:10, 62:1,
62:6, 62:10, 63:16,
64:5
Means - 3:24,
76:22
Measured - 5:8,
12:21, 97:4
Measurement - 13
7:14
Measuring - 6:3, 93:2

Meeting - 84:14
Mentor-22:20
Mercer - 69:8,
88:8, 88:18, 88:23,
90:5
Mercer's - 89:5
Merger - 100:19
Merits - 74:9
Million - 4:24, 5:1,
54:18, 56:8, 56:11,
141:23, 141:25
Millions - 41:21,
42:11, 45:4, 45:20,
54:15
Minor - 129:20
Minus - 155:16,
156:17
Mislead - 59:22
Misled - 49:21
Misrepresent - 59:
18
Missed - 134:5
Misspoke - 60:14
Misstated - 2:3
Mixture - 29:10,
100:19
Monday - 115:14,
166:5
Money - 55:15,
55:19, 57:17,
57:19, 57:21, 58:9,
64:22
Monies - 67:25,
68:3
Month - 134:14
Months - 6:24,
144:11
Morning - 1:3,
9:20, 160:6, 160:8,
161:5, 161:6
Motion - 72:22,
73:7
Mouse - 47:12
Move - 8:24, 137:1
Moving - 29:11
Much - 5:23, 41:1,
52:21, 55:19, 91:5,
91:7, 93:2, 94:7,
126:13, 132:13,
144:10, 144:11,
150:22, 157:8,
159:6, 160:17
Multiply - 141:18
$\mathbf{N}$

Necessary - 70:8,
94:10
Net - 80:3, 90:1,
96:15
New - 7:5, 20:23,
37:12, 37:13,

37:17, 39:15, 42:3,
97:8, 113:12, 130:9, 133:7, 135:11, 135:24, 136:15, 158:2
Newer - 149:6
Newfoundlanders

- 80:25

Newspaper - 80:23
Night - 131:14
Noon - 159:4
Note - 104:4
Notice - 22:1
Notionally - 6:6
Nova - 18:24, 20:1,
20:21, 32:13,
32:22, 33:3, 34:5,
34:18, 35:5, 35:23,
36:10, 37:5, 38:20,
38:22, 39:15,
41:18, 41:24, 42:1,
44:18, 44:19, 45:2,
45:18, 52:8, 54:12,
54:20, 56:7, 57:4,
82:10, 97:8,
127:13, 128:3,
129:3, 130:6,
130:9, 130:19,
131:16, 131:17,
131:18, 132:3,
135:11, 135:24,
146:8, 157:7, 158:1
November - 35:3,
36:13, 130:7,
130:19, 134:7,
136:9
Nugget - 61:21,
61:23
Numbers - 15:8,
15:13, 15:15,
15:22, 57:3, 57:7,
98:3, 101:9,
120:23, 123:3,
144:6, 144:9,
151:4, 152:22,
155:5

## 0

Obligation - 15:6
Observing - 154:1 6
Occur - 74:10,
90:14, 130:18,
153:21, 156:7,
156:8
Occurred - 3:19,
3:22, 3:24, 4:6,
46:5, 49:1, 49:16,
49:17, 137:15,
157:25
Occurs - 136:8

| October - 113:8 | 67:8 | 114:13, 115:6, | Policy - 5:12, | 157:2, 157:4 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Offensive - 164:15 | Overstated-83:5 | 145:17 | 114:16 | 7:13, 159:13, |
| Offer - 145:21 | Own - 77:19, | Payers - 70:16 | Pool - 8:13, 8:19 | 16 |
| Office - 67:7 | 121:13, 123:9, | Paying - 71:8, | POP - 4:14, 6:3 | Presenters - 88:21, |
| Offices - 47:1 | 123:15, 136:22 | 82:7, 90:18, 145:16 | Portfolio-8:21 | 161:2 |
| Offset -99:17, | Owned - 59:4, | Payments - 147:3 | Portion-30:5 | Presenting-26:9, |
| 144:22 | 61:25 | Payout - 150:23 | Position-16:23, | 29:4, 49:22, 63:9, |
| Often - 5:8, 128:19 |  | Payouts - 109:19, | 80:24, 80:25, 89:11, | 91:14, 91:16, |
| Old - 144:9 | P | 137:1, 137:8, | 161:12 | 93:23, 105:9 |
| Older - 100:20, | Paid - 4:6, 5:17, | 140:4, 141:24, | Positions-161:21, | Presumably - 46:1 |
| 109:22, 116:7, | $5: 18,5: 22,5: 25$ | 145:5, 147:14 | 161:23, 163:24 | 0, 47:1, 86:13, |
| 128:23, 149:14, | 5:18, 5:22, 5:25, | Pdf - 3:9, 8:25 | Positive -5:24, | 150:16 |
| 150:11, 154:21 | $\begin{aligned} & 6: 1,7: 20,7: 21, \\ & 10: 14.39: 24 . \end{aligned}$ | Peak-135:10 | 25:24, 30:19, | Previous - 17:2 |
| Oliver-21:18, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 10:14, 39:24, } \\ & 66: 12,66: 13, \end{aligned}$ | Peer-23:7 | 155:25 | Previously - 25:10, |
| 23:7, 25:13, 39:9, | 67:12, 67:15, 68:1, | People - 17:12, | Potential - 15:2, | $50: 23$ |
| 46:11, 54:23, 59:4, | 68:10, 81:10, | 26:11, 65:2, 70:15, | 70:4 | Price - 71:8 |
| 60:1, 61:1, 61:25, |  | 99:23 | Potentially - 70:10 | Pricing - 66:3 |
| 63:7, 64:17, 64:22, | 99 | Percentage - 4:13, | Practices - 146:7 | Print - 104:12 |
| 69:7, 111:17, 118:2, | 110:13, 111:6, | 6:4, 6:6, 78:17, | Pre-8:2, 8:21, | Prior - 6:14, 7:15, |
| 119:15, 119:20, | 111:13, 112:13, | 78:18, 81:14, | 10:3, 132:14 | 10:20, 29:1, 39:25, |
| 125:13, 125:18 | 118:21, 118:22, | 82:14, 94:15, 95:9, | Precedent - 145:8 | 50:2, 91:19, 97:25, |
| One - 1:6, 2:14, | 118:23, 119:17, | 99:6 | Predict -53:17, | 134:19, 135:7, |
| 4:13, 5:10, 8:18, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 118:23, 119:17, } \\ & \text { 123:13, 124:16, } \end{aligned}$ | Percentages - 92:2 | 137:17 | 135:13, 135:22, |
| 10:1, 14:18, 15:19, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 123:13, } 124: 16, \\ & 126.14 \\ & 126.25, \end{aligned}$ | 0 | Premiums - 4:2, | 146:2 |
| 23:18, 30:12, 33:8, | $\begin{aligned} & 126: 14,126: 25, \\ & 141: 23,144: 22, \end{aligned}$ | Performed - 136:2 | 4:25, 5:3, 5:12 | Private - 2:9, 2:16 |
| 59:5, 59:10, 66:2, | $\begin{aligned} & 141: 23,144: 22, \\ & 145: 13,146: 1, \end{aligned}$ |  | 5:17, 5:22, 16:5, | 3:1, 3:5, 3:13, 4:9, |
| 69:17, 70:1, 72:13, | 145:13, 146:1, | Perhaps - 25:23, | 24:17, 38:6, 39:22, | 7:9, 10:15, 82:21, |
| 78:11, 92:16, 94:15, | 152:10 | 27:23, 60:13, | 41:3, 43:6, 43:7, | 82:25, 83:5, 84:5, |
| 105:10, 107:25, | 145:19 | 148:15 | 43:11, 43:16, 45:1, | 96:12, 100:17, |
| 109:7, 116:8, | Panel - | Period - 2:18, 8:4, | 45:7, 45:23, 49:17, | 116:12, 123:21 |
| 116:24, 134:14, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Pane } \\ & \text { 21:13 } \end{aligned}$ | 23:5, 24:5, 26:22, | 53:14, 66:3, 81:1, | Problem-28:21, |
| 134:17, 134:23, | Parent - 60:8, | 29:20, 29:23, | 81:10, 81:24, | 50:5, 157:10, |
| 140:23, 149:21, | $62: 24,63: 2,$ | 30:10, 44:25, 45:1, | 124:6, 125:15, | 162:24, 163:20 |
| 157:12, 161:2, | $64: 13,64: 19,$ | 45:8, 50:2, 54:9, | 125:24, 126:17, | Problems - 70:11 |
| 162:6, 163:11, | $64: 23,65: 4$ | 55:8, 55:18, 87:11, | 127:7, 127:10, | Procedure - 162:8 |
| 163:13, 165:4, | Participated - 84:1 | 135:8, 135:9, | 127:21, 128:6, | Proceed - 72:18 |
| 165:7 | Participated - 84:1 | 135:17, 137:24 | 128:7, 128:13, | Produce - 121:5 |
| Ones-71:7 |  | 139:15 | 128:14, 129:18, | Produced-19:9, |
| Ongoing - $64: 5$ | Particularly - 23.20 | Periods - 7:15 | 155:13 | 23:4 |
| Ontario-81:23, | Parties - 64:1, | 29:6, 116:5 | Preparation -7:6 | Product - 23:7, |
| 97:8 | 74:20, 94:6, 147:2, | Personal - 8:16, | Prepare - 63:10 | 151:18 |
| Open-138:5 |  | 8:18 | Prepared - 2:13, | Profession-16:11 |
| Operate -60:21, | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Par } \\ & \text { 85: } \end{aligned}$ | Perspective - 21:1 | 3:4, 7:2, 23:7, | Profit - 2:12, 2:15, |
| 86:9, 95:19 |  | 8, 31:4, 144:16 | 32:14, 56:1, 57:8, | 3:12, 4:12, 4:13, |
| Operation-4:8, | Passenger - 2:9, | Peters - 133:5 | 72:17, 107:12, | 5:8, 5:20, 6:2, 8:23, |
| 7:19, 7:22, 8:8, | $2: 16,3: 2,3: 5,3: 13,$ | Picture-26:19, | 107:21, 123:10 | 9:23, 12:6, 12:22, |
| 60:25, 62:10, | $4: 9,7: 9,10: 16$ | 50:10, 58:25, | Preparing - 33:18, | 24:4, 25:7, 25:9, |
| 62:17, 64:4 | $82: 21,82: 25,83: 5$ | 71:15, 129:12 | 46:11, 111:21, | 25:22, 26:15, 27:5, |
| Opinions - 22:13 |  | Pie - 134:20 | 160:8 | 37:4, 41:19, 53:6, |
| Opposite - 126:11 | 84:6, 96:12, | Place - 20:1, 20:24, | Present - 9:8 | 54:15, 54:18, |
| Order - 103:9, | 100:18, 116:12, | 32:12, 34:21, 35:6, | 16:17, 53:5, 54:2, | 56:18, 58:19, |
| 103:10, 129:8 |  | 36:13, 37:6, 37:14, | 54:5, 59:16, 64:3, | 85:13, 93:4, 95:1 |
| Ordered - 105:3 | Passes - $15: 22$ | 130:6, 134:7, | 148:5 | 126:8, 127:9, |
| Otherwise - 71:14, | $\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{P a} \\ & 25 \end{aligned}$ | 134:14, 136:9 | Presentation - 2:8, | 156:21, 159:11 |
| 165:13 | $53: 15,53: 17,117: 5,$ | Placed - 130:18 | 11:7, 58:21, 100:16, | Profitability - 2:8, |
| Ourselves - 162:10 | 137:15, 137:16, | Plausible - 116:17 | 159:25 | 11:24, 12:14, 12:18, |
| , 163:15 | $140: 19,147: 2$ | Plummeted - 40:13 | Presented - 24:2, | 16:6, 23:25, 24:21, |
| Outlier - 154:6 | $\text { Paula - } 70: 16$ | Pocket - 58:3 | 26:15, 53:4, 55:1, | 24:24, 25:16, |
| Outline-1:18, |  | Points - 70:13, | 55:3, 55:4, 55:5, | 26:20, 27:11, 27:14, |
| 70:11 | Pay-5:4, 5:13, | 99:6 | 57:11, 59:15, 94:2, | 31:18, 31:24, 47:2, |
| Overhead-67:7, | $\begin{aligned} & 20.0,20: 2,80: 10, \\ & 68: 2,80: 25,82: 10, \end{aligned}$ | Policies - 10:16 | $95: 1,155: 21,$ | $50: 11,59: 2,67: 13$ |

75:1, 155:17, 158:1 Profitable-26:2, 26:4, 26:12, 26:23, 27:15, 28:22, 29:8, 29:20, 63:1, 64:13 Profits - 34:19, 35:4, 36:12, 38:3, 39:1, 45:4, 49:6, 53:3, 53:7, 53:12, 53:19, 56:25, 59:21, 64:17, 71:9
Program - 60:15
Projected - 10:21
Projecting - 10:24
Projects - 22:22
Property - 8:16,
8:18
Propose - 162:16
Proposed - 163:15
Prospective - 53:1
6, 124:23, 125:8
Proved - 12:16
Provide - 1:14,
11:22, 16:13, 17:9, 48:9, 61:17, 89:12,
100:25, 101:1,
115:5, 141:1
Provided - 14:8,
15:8, 17:10, 22:2,
32:21, 39:8, 48:11,
58:24, 59:3, 59:20,
75:24, 76:24,
77:21, 77:22,
104:5, 105:14,
106:7, 110:3,
111:22, 113:21,
124:7, 124:15,
129:4, 142:9,
143:3, 143:12
Provider - 76:17
Provides - 58:25,
159:15
Providing - 17:12, 47:22
Provinces - 14:22, 33:25, 38:7, 65:11,
67:23, 72:19,
84:22, 90:15,
94:14, 97:10, 97:11,
98:2, 100:4,
130:10, 134:3,
135:12, 157:22
Provision - 5:20, 9:23, 25:6, 25:9, 31:13, 48:17, 88:3, 88:19, 88:23, 89:6, 101:5, 101:6, 101:8, 122:13,
126:8
Public - 49:21,
59:19, 161:2

Publicly - 62:4
Published - 6:18,
7:5, 8:7, 105:15, 121:1, 122:12,
123:6
Publishes - 13:13
Pull-28:1, 87:12,
130:25, 142:12
Pulled - 122:19
Puts - 118:11,
120:21
PWC - 77:15
Q

Quality - 65:15
Quarter - 113:18
Questioned - 63:9,
101:25
Questioning - 65:1
3, 71:21, 71:22, 73:23, 74:1, 74:8, 74:19
Quickly - 10:8 Quoted - 48:24, 107:18
$\begin{array}{r}\text { R } \\ \hline\end{array}$
Raise - 17:3, 72:20,
94:5, 165:3
Raised - 65:7,
72:15, 159:22,
160:2, 160:5
Range - 14:21,
15:15, 15:20,
34:12, 93:12,
105:19
Ranging - 29:15
Rates - $8: 1,8: 2$,
8:5, 8:6, 8:7, 12:17,
20:3, 20:11, 20:23,
31:17, 43:2, 44:20,
52:15, 69:18,
87:13, 100:23,
102:9, 105:5,
126:8, 127:1
Rather - 80:2
Ration - 35:13
Ratios - 6:9, 6:11,
6:19, 6:24, 7:13,
7:16, 9:21, 10:25, 33:24, 37:13, 38:9, 39:5, 40:12, 41:17, 47:5, 52:20, 52:24, 55:7, 57:11, 83:4, 84:19, 91:4, 91:15, 94:7, 94:13, 95:2, 97:10, 100:25, 110:7, 110:8, 127:24
Reach - 17:11

Reader - 24:2
Ready - 2:7
Realized - 12:6
Reason-8:8,
15:24, 59:3, 91:2,
91:11, 96:7, 108:16, 162:12
Reasonable - 13:4, 15:15, 16:16,
16:18, 25:9, 28:12,
28:23, 29:1, 31:24,
45:5, 55:21, 89:6, 92:24, 93:13,
104:18
Reasonableness -
14:9, 14:13, 15:21,
15:25, 31:5, 100:12
Reasons - 147:24,
151:24
Received - 45:22,
111:3
Receiving - 78:8
Recent - 6:16,
6:23, 7:3, 7:13,
96:3, 109:24, 116:5,
125:12, 139:6,
139:8, 140:15,
148:3, 153:7,
154:19
Recently - 6:15
Reciprocate - 163:
22
Recommendation

- 146:15

Recommended - 1
04:25, 105:2, 108:2
Reconciled - 76:2,
77:7, 97:12
Reconciles - 77:4
Reconciliation-77 :2
Reduce - 114:4
Reduced - 116:14
Reducing - 45:7
Reduction - 38:6,
38:17, 38:21,
42:25, 44:25, 45:23
Referenced - 1:18,
1:24, 2:1
Referred - 1:12,
109:25, 110:19,
114:17, 114:22,
114:23, 158:9
Reflection-3:19,
50:2
Reflects - 152:10, 152:13
Reform - 39:17,
40:6, 40:7, 129:21,
129:22
Reforms - 39:20,

135:14, 135:15,
135:23, 135:25,
136:1, 136:13,
136:15, 136:16,
157:19
Regime - 89:22
Regression - 147:5
Regulation - 62:18
Regulators - 62:15
Rein - 122:22
Reinsurer-59:14,
60:13
Reinsurers - 59:10
Reiterate - 71:5
Reject - 71:25
Rejected - 72:1
Relation-1:10,
71:10, 164:14
Relationship - 63:2
, 63:14, 64:13,
64:24
Reliable - 149:6,
150:7
Relies - 59:11,
61:10, 77:20
Relying - 110:6
Rent - 10:14,
66:21, 90:18, 94:21
Rents - 7:21
Repetition - 161:14
, 161:17, 164:2
Repetitive - 163:2
Reported - 7:11,
14:17, 75:5, 82:23,
91:16, 91:17,
91:25, 92:1, 92:2,
93:4, 93:9, 96:10,
97:20, 101:11,
106:16, 110:14,
110:18, 111:2,
114:9, 114:15,
120:23, 129:15,
152:13
Reporting - 80:2,
80:8, 80:9, 80:18,
91:14, 91:20,
91:22, 93:23,
97:22, 98:12,
100:21, 105:13,
120:23, 142:16
Reports - 18:15,
19:10, 19:14, 20:7,
20:15, 63:10, 63:11,
64:3, 65:8, 76:3
Request - 107:22,
159:8
Requested - 108:1
4
Require - 158:19
Required - 2:20,
7:10, 9:8, 9:14,

13:11, 41:3, 80:9, 125:14
Requirement - 129 :6
Reserves - 35:21,
40:20, 109:19,
114:1, 114:2, 114:5, 114:8, 115:11,
117:3, 117:4, 117:5, 117:18, 122:16,
122:23, 122:24,
123:1, 123:14,
125:19, 125:23,
126:14, 127:16,
128:8, 139:8,
140:4, 144:1,
146:13, 151:5,
152:7, 157:8
Reserving - 146:6
Resolve - 17:21
Resolved - 18:4
Respect - 21:9,
22:12, 22:14,
22:17, 23:20,
65:21, 72:15,
72:21, 87:11, 117:6, 159:25
Responded - 21:21
Response - 1:17,
2:4
Responses - 166:2
Responsibility - 16 :23
Result - 35:12,
38:2, 38:16, 39:21,
40:12, 42:24,
128:23, 129:17,
153:9, 165:24
Resulting - 11:4
Results - 24:1,
49:23, 49:24, 50:1,
56:17, 140:14
RESUME - 72:11
Retain - 57:25
Retained - 11:22,
16:12
Retainment - 12:4
Retired - 22:7,
22:10, 62:12
Retrospective - 12 3:21, 124:22, 125:7
Returns - 44:17,
47:11, 48:20, 48:22
Reviewed - 14:7,
23:8, 23:16, 29:24,
97:13
Reviewing - 12:13,
15:12, 62:2, 125:6
Reviews - 18:10,
113:24, 113:25
Rights - 58:12,

71:12
Risks - 82:23, 83:3
Robust - 34:19
Rocks - 69:2
ROE - 48:18
Role - 12:8, 14:24, 14:25, 16:3, 16:11,
61:17
Roll - 64:18
Rose - 43:6
Ruling - 73:1,
73:10, 73:20, 74:4,
100:9
Run - 107:25
Running-4:8,
7:19, 7:22
Russians - 65:20

| $\mathbf{S}$ |
| :---: |

Salaries - 7:20, 10:14, 66:20, 67:3,
90:17, 94:21, 99:22
Sarah - 142:23
Saw - 16:25,
140:24, 146:7
Scandalous - 37:4
Scenario-158:16
Science - 143:24
Scotia - 18:24,
20:1, 20:21, 32:13,
32:22, 33:3, 34:5,
34:18, 35:5, 35:23,
36:10, 37:6, 38:20,
38:22, 39:15,
41:18, 41:24, 42:1,
44:18, 44:19, 45:3,
45:18, 52:8, 54:12,
54:20, 56:7, 57:4,
82:10, 97:8,
127:13, 128:3,
129:3, 130:7,
130:9, 130:19,
131:17, 131:19,
132:3, 135:11,
135:24, 146:8,
157:8, 158:2
Screen - 55:2,
131:9
Scroll-104:10
Seasonality - 134:
18
Sec - 26:18
Second - 2:19,
59:9, 79:15, 88:20,
135:9
Secret - 62:7
Seeing - 161:16
Seen - 18:14,
18:21, 18:22, 37:11,
37:12, 115:20,
117:4

Segments - 161:13
Seldom - 116:21
Selected - 88:18,
88:23
Selection - 89:5
Senior - 145:25
Sent - 110:5
Separate - 36:6,
60:4, 60:25
Separately - 120:1
Server-46:10,
47:1
Service - 76:17
Services - 60:16
Session - 160:9
Set - 39:23, 41:8, 110:19, 112:14, 115:2, 119:18, 120:18, 123:14, 124:16, 126:9, 127:2, 127:7, 127:10, 127:21, 128:13, 152:12, 158:11, 158:20
Setting - 5:16,
39:24, 128:22
Settle - 111:1
Settled - 3:25,
109:23, 111:11,
111:15, 119:1,
119:13, 147:1,
150:18, 156:23
Settlement - 153:1 8
Settlements - 146: 2
Seven-78:14
Several - 88:21, 98:1, 140:19
Severity - 137:8, 137:9, 137:19, 139:3, 139:20, 140:18, 144:15, 147:15, 148:6, 153:10
Sharp - 130:15, 130:17, 134:4, 134:5, 134:12, 136:7, 136:10, 136:12
Sheet - 140:11
She's - 70:23
Show - 10:10,
26:18, 59:20, 70:9,
70:22, 126:16,
142:3, 146:19,
148:10
Showed - 9:21,
127:23
Showing - 47:2
Side - 21:24

Signed - 77:7, 97:13
Significant - 16:1, 17:25, 35:22, 38:5, 39:1, 109:7, 132:24, 153:1
Significantly - 96:8 , 131:20, 133:25, 134:13, 155:2, 155:8, 155:17, 156:14
Similar - 6:25,
11:3, 52:14, 52:16,
54:11, 54:16, 56:17,
57:4, 114:25,
145:13, 161:11,
161:12, 163:23
Simple - 77:17
Simply - 36:10,
64:10
Sit - 31:18
Sits - 160:3
Sitting - 21:24,
43:8, 107:5
Situation - 25:2,
41:2, 65:6
Six - 6:23, 55:1
Skew - 27:14
Slightly - 7:14,
83:4, 116:8
Slim - 157:4
Slow - 133:22
Slowed - 134:13
Small - 95:8, 95:15
Smaller - 99:13
Snapshot - 30:21,
48:12, 48:25, 54:8
Soft - 24:14, 24:23
Sold - 43:17,
128:15
Someone's - 27:15
Somewhat - 135:9,
164:15
Sought - 12:15
Sound - 81:8,
116:21
Sounds - 154:5
Specific - 82:21,
82:25, 84:5, 96:12,
121:8, 164:5
Spent - 70:10
Split - 162:9
Spot-51:25,
57:10, 57:15
Spread - 90:13
Sr - 65:22
Staff - 10:15,
90:17, 145:25
STAMP - 68:18,
68:23, 74:5,
160:22, 163:17,

164:7, 164:25,
165:1, 165:18,
166:6
Stand - 5:11
Standard-85:12,
85:22
Start - 25:23
Started - 80:1,
98:12, 165:23
Starting - 165:21
Startling - 36:24
Starts - 8:25,
25:20, 161:18
Statement - 55:9,
76:2, 86:23, 90:10,
98:2, 101:9
Stating - 45:14
Statistical-78:3,
89:11, 146:19,
147:11, 147:19,
148:9
Stay - 134:23
Steady - 126:17,
155:3, 155:13,
155:14
Steep - 39:10,
129:13
Steeply - 39:20, 135:24
Step-5:6, 114:6
Stop - 49:14, 56:1,
57:13, 115:12
Stopped - 134:12
Straight - 1:4
Strictly -62:17
Structure -91:20,
100:21
Studies - 18:16,
135:18
Study - 1:25, 2:12,
2:13, 2:25, 3:7,
3:11, 146:23
Submits - 75:18,
101:16
Submitted - 76:1,
77:3
Subsequent - 38:1
0, 124:21, 151:2,
152:21
Subsequently - 35:
22, 48:20
Subsidiary - 60:1,
62:23, 64:10,
64:18, 64:25
Successful - 68:11
Suffering - 68:12,
145:20
Sufficient - 5:7,
5:13, 25:5, 25:21,
30:10, 74:12, 111:9
Suggested -93:14,

95:7, 155:16
Sum - 76:6, 115:11
Summary - 3:11,
8:22, 33:4
Supplemental - 11
2:3, 112:7, 115:10,
115:22, 116:13,
117:3, 117:5,
117:17, 117:19,
118:11, 119:21,
120:21, 121:6,
121:15, 121:22,
122:6, 122:16,
123:7, 123:9,
123:15, 124:18,
126:15, 127:15,
136:19, 136:21,
136:24, 138:20,
149:7, 151:6,
152:8, 152:24,
156:12
Supplied - 75:12
Support - 100:25,
148:5
Supported - 101:7
Supporting - 72:22 , 73:7
Supposed - 47:22
Surplus - 9:24,
10:1
Surprised - 23:19
Survey - 80:8
Suspect - 151:4
Suspicion - 71:22,
72:2
Sworn - 69:4

## T

Table - 3:10, 6:9,
6:17, 7:7, 7:25, 9:7, 9:21, 10:8, 24:3,
155:21
Tables - 8:21, 8:22
Tail - 116:4
Taking - 71:11
Target - 15:3,
30:12, 30:22, 42:5,
48:17
Targeted - 32:8
Tax-4:13, 4:17,
8:2, 8:21, 9:22,
10:3, 11:4, 13:16,
31:12, 48:18,
52:15, 82:22, 85:6,
86:5, 94:15, 95:5,
95:8, 98:14
Taxes - 4:10, 7:17,
10:12, 66:12
Taxi - 4:22
Ted - 62:11, 62:12
Telling - 14:10,

120:9
Tells - 129:12
Ten-2:17, 6:14, 8:4, 12:23, 24:1, 24:4, 26:15, 28:14, 28:23, 29:24, 30:1,
30:13, 30:18,
30:22, 31:7, 31:9,
31:12, 31:20, 34:9,
42:5, 42:13, 45:6,
45:21, 48:18,
48:23, 49:1, 49:23,
50:2, 116:4
Term - 16:9, 114:2
Terminology - $60: 1$
0, 67:8, 126:23,
127:1
Terms - 1:20, 10:2, 13:5, 14:5, 15:4, 27:11, 29:4, 31:4,
31:16, 38:21, 39:6,
41:19, 43:11, 48:7,
55:15, 56:18,
56:25, 59:1, 63:9,
67:2, 69:18, 69:19,
71:21, 81:14,
84:18, 86:7, 86:20,
90:10, 92:8, 95:5,
95:6, 96:16,
100:15, 107:13,
107:16, 116:11,
117:2, 121:19,
122:16, 136:19,
155:5, 163:5
Terribly -51:17
Test - 108:24,
109:4, 139:13,
139:14, 139:23
Theory-122:22,
122:23
Therefore - 70:6, 145:20
There's - 1:25, 4:25, 5:6, 5:15, 17:4, 25:3, 25:4,
26:1, 28:21, 31:23,
68:7, 69:12, 71:23,
72:18, 82:8, 85:1,
99:4, 106:15, 112:7, 113:17, 126:3,
128:21, 130:10,
152:12, 154:19,
159:11
These - 4:1, 6:10,
6:11, 7:7, 7:12,
7:15, 7:21, 8:2, 8:4, 8:6, 8:16, 8:17, 13:3, 22:21, 39:1, 47:5, 53:2, 53:5, 53:12, 54:2, 57:11, 69:1, 91:3, 96:2,

101:9, 123:10, 155:22
They're - 26:3,
26:22, 43:21,
60:14, 70:18,
85:13, 90:18,
90:23, 98:20,
117:17, 126:25,
128:25, 145:16,
154:22, 162:10,
164:20
They've - 107:11,
126:13, 148:8,
162:20, 162:21,
163:8
Thick - 135:8
Third-2:25
Thorough - 11:23,
48:8, 50:7, 61:18,
62:25, 63:25,
64:12, 65:1, $94: 4$
Thoroughly - 63:11 , 164:1
Thousand - 129:13
Three - 2:14, 5:15,
10:20, 11:2, 95:9,
99:6, 99:9, 101:1,
144:8, 165:25
Threw - 54:12
Throw - 69:2
Time - 3:7, 7:5, 15:13, 26:22, 27:5, 29:24, 30:11, 31:25, 74:12, 87:12, 88:9, 89:22, 97:21,
101:21, 102:14, 104:6, 116:5, 128:8,
128:16, 128:22,
129:11, 135:18,
139:15, 140:13,
151:20, 153:18,
156:25, 161:25,
162:19, 162:21,
162:22, 165:12
Timeframe - 38:7,
39:3, 45:3, 45:24,
49:19, 55:20, 79:2,
79:16, 80:14,
86:23, 90:4, 152:7
Timeline - 137:24,
138:4
Timely - 89:13
Times - 26:1, 26:3, 128:25
Timing-163:5
Titled-32:21
Today - 11:21,
12:8, 14:24, 15:1, 15:6, 16:3, 16:23, 22:3, 31:18, 46:12, 54:3, 58:16, 58:18,

62:2, 102:2, 108:8, 128:13, 128:17, 136:25, 143:4, 143:15, 143:16, 157:10, 159:24
Today's - 106:14, 160:8
Took - 20:1, 32:12
Top - 42:23, 51:20,
84:1, 102:20
Topic - 14:6, 36:6, 163:3
Toronto - 86:8
Tot - 76:2
Total - 8:20, 76:6,
83:4, 97:12,
104:17, 119:12,
129:16
Totals - 111:13
Towards - 82:9
Transcript - 1:9,
70:22, 112:19,
113:5
Transcripts - 161:1
7, 163:6
Transition - 80:13
Translated - 35:2
Transported - 106:
13
Trend-54:16,
148:4, 148:6
Trends - 16:25
Trial - 47:18, 72:19,
128:4, 161:19
Troubled - 58:23
Tuesday - 115:14
Turn - 74:25, 110:5
Turned - 146:11
Turquoise - 131:19
Two - 4:12, 28:2,
38:16, 99:6, 99:8,
114:8, 123:19,
144:23, 162:11,
162:14, 162:25,
163:12
Types - 114:8,
156:7
Typical - 34:12,
117:9
Typically - 101:1,
116:23, 117:9,
118:12, 122:24
U
Ultimate - 109:17,
124:9, 127:23,
141:7, 148:25,
150:2, 150:23,
151:4, 152:6,
155:6, 155:24
Unable - 57:14

Unanticipated - 39
:7
Uncertainty - 154:
19
Underestimated -
126:3
Undermine - 71:24
Understood-12:8,
137:6
Undertaking - 107:
10, 107:21, 108:7,
143:3, 143:12,
143:22, 158:5,
158:19
Undertakings - 16
5:5
Underwriting -90:
23
Unexpected - 40:1
7
Unfair-71:16
Unintelligible - 45:
19
Unless - 72:4
Unprepared - 57:1
4
Unusual - 153:15,
153:21, 154:17
Ups - 25:15
Uptake - 132:13
Used - 5:2, 5:4,
10:2, 10:19, 97:25,
105:6, 114:25,
155:1
Uses - 76:16
Using - 3:4, 6:13,
16:15, 43:21,
124:15, 128:19,
128:23, 140:9
Utility - 20:22,
107:8, 127:18,
128:3, 129:5
Utilized - 162:8
V

Validation-76:18,
78:5
Value - 161:25
Values - 101:4
Varies - 85:2, 86:6
Vehicles - 90:20
Versus - 15:17,
79:22, 94:18,
96:14, 99:11, 99:24,
105:21, 107:17,
155:6
Victim - 70:17
Victims - 15:2,
45:18, 58:11, 71:7,
71:16
View - 16:14,

16:18, 27:15,
28:10, 88:22,
91:24, 108:24
Volatile - 139:7,
146:7
Volume - 90:12,
90:15, 90:18,
90:22, 99:13
Voluntary - 80:7, 91:21
W

Wages - 118:22
Wait-26:18, 122:19
Wants - 74:10,
164:9
Wasn't - 26:25,
39:17, 58:24, 61:4,
76:10, 91:24, 92:4,
109:4, 135:19,
161:5
Watchdog - 15:1,
15:7, 16:4, 16:9,
16:10, 16:19,
47:20, 48:4
Water - 49:8
Ways - 139:13,
139:16, 156:20,
156:22
Weather-151:21, 154:13
Website - 1:22
We'd - 73:25
Week - 3:17, 70:11,
128:17, 166:4
Weigh - 69:23
Weight - 70:2
We'll-14:4, 27:23,
32:25, 33:14,
35:20, 36:2, 44:4,
47:11, 53:1, 72:23,
87:21, 103:24,
122:3, 122:19,
136:18, 147:9,
148:16, 160:14,
166:1, 166:4, 166:5
We're - 4:17, 5:21,
6:3, 7:6, 10:24,
23:25, 24:8, 29:23,
34:6, 37:18, 38:23,
40:24, 41:20,
54:14, 55:6, 57:10,
58:13, 60:4, 62:5,
65:13, 68:24,
69:14, 69:25, 70:5,
71:15, 72:8, 74:6,
89:20, 91:14, 93:2,
93:23, 94:20,
94:25, 95:18,
97:22, 98:9, 98:20,



